Richard Moore

Dear cj & rn,

Below is Mark Whitaker's prise-winning essay, THREE STRATEGIES FOR

We've had a thread on cj regarding the "NEW CULTURE", started by Brian
Hill, who also contributes regularly to rn.  That thead is about what _may
be a resurgance of a communitarian (ie, noncompetitive, non-acquisitive,
cooperation-oriented) movement in the US - reminiscent of the sixties
hippie/communitarian movement.  I say "may", because there is some debate
about whether the resurgance is real, or whether Brian (and some others)
only _wish it was happening.  Personally, I'm still undecided on this
point.  I have immense respect for Brian, but I haven't seen enough
evidence to make up my own mind first-hand.

Mark's essay addresses not what _is happening, but rather what he believes
_needs to happen if a viable, stable, grass-roots kind of democracy is to
arise and prosper.

Mark has thought about these issues a lot, and he is a very perceptive
analyst.  I recommend the essay to you, and would welcome follow-up
discussion on either or both lists.  As I see it, this topic is of central
importance, and Mark is one of the few who has the insight and audacity to
approach it in a systematic way.

best regards,

BTW> I will be putting the formatted version on the CDR website, together
with a link to Mark's site.

Date: Wed, 17 Feb 1999 20:10:25 -0600
To: •••@••.•••, •••@••.•••
From: Mark Douglas Whitaker <•••@••.•••>
Subject: WWW: site and essay announcement: strategizing sustainability
  and democracy in the long run


        I have web-posted an essay entitled "LOCAL, NATIONAL, GLOBAL: THREE
PRACTICE," at http://www.sit.wisc.edu/~mrkdwhit/3strat.htm. It's an edited
version of my 1998 Lelio Basso Prize Competition entry. The late Lelio Basso
was an Italian socialist who felt that democratic procedures and
socioeconomic development had to go hand in hand. The Prize was established
in his honor after he died.

        The crux of the essay is theorizing ways to moderate the hegemony of
United States politically and economically, keeping in mind the dual tenets
of creating a 'sustainable democracy' organizationally speaking at the same
time we consider 'sustainable economics.' The politics of the United States
and the politics of the World Bank (marionetted in large part by United
States investments) are crucial areas to consider. I offer structural
additions to integrate local grass roots activity as well as ideas for
opening international capital markets based on existing economies of scale.

        The essay is part of a larger site I am establishing at:


        Comments welcome. Activity desired.


Mark Whitaker
University of Wisconsin-Madison

From: http://www.sit.wisc.edu/~mrkdwhit/3strat.htm


                         Mark Douglas Whitaker
                    University of Wisconsin-Madison






            2.Present History

            3.LOCAL: CDI: Civic Democratic Institutions: Preparing and
            Maintaining Local Input in Nation-State Level Politics and
            Cultural Frames

            4.NATIONAL: Hanse Nationalism: Balancing Local and National
            Identities and Politics

            5.GLOBAL: "Affirmative Cooperatives:" Using Mutualized
            Economies of Scale for Developing a Separate Third World
            Financial Sector

            6.Conclusion: DeGlobalization: Notes for a Philosophy of
            Development, and Nation-State Democratic Security

This is an essay on strategic response to globalization of capital into
transnational corporate forms (TNC's), based on what local, national, and
international organizations can do to align strategically their different
dimensions of politics to a separate yet simultaneous systemic press which
is long-term and short-term. This involves two major areas:

    (1) to moderate nation-state level politics;

    (2) to provide a means to let Third World nation-states have the
    ability to help themselves as a group by developing a capital market
    for themselves, breaking the developmental monopoly of
    international lending organizations like the World Bank.

The three areas detailed below have been thought out for their long term
systemic effects on the local, nation-state, and international levels; they
have many second-order effects which could make this essay easily a book
length work. Therefore, I will only introduce these strategies with a sense
of what they are 'designed' to accomplish. I stress 'designed' because of
the thought into the second-order effects (meaning how it affects and
facilitates grass roots, long-term participation in political and econmic
decision making, and creates sustainable structures for such political
processes. I call it creating a 'sustainable politics.' A sustainable
politics is a politics that avoids clientelistic relationships in its

Examples of clientelistic relatinships are lack of bank choices forcing
someone to work with existing structures or a lack of choices of political
representatives that works to the advantage of removing local political and
economic input and making local interests dependent on proxy-only
relationships to power.

This essay is a political analysis from a theoretical portrayal, drawing
from much comparative research on organizational development and political
process. It takes the following David Korten quotes quite seriously:

Without a theory, the assumptions underlying the organization's choice of
intervention are never made explicit. Therefore they cannot be tested
against experience, essentially eliminating the possibility of experience
based learning

. . . [I]n the absence of a theory, the aspiring [actor] almost inevitably
becomes instead merely an assistance agency engaged in relieving the more
visible symptoms. . .through relief and welfare measures. . . .[his italics]

Without a theory, the organization can only proceed to scatter its
resources in response to immediately visible needs [or perceived needs]. .
. Our present concern is with the threefold global crisis of poverty,
environmental destruction, and social disintegration. . . .The more we
focus our attention directly on the symptoms, rather than on transforming
the institutions and values that cause them, the more certain we can be
that the crisis will deepen for lack of appropriate action. Under the
circumstance, the need for a theory of the causes of the breakdown is of
more than academic relevance. [Korten, 1990]

By the above term "transforming the institutions' is taken to mean less
changing peoples minds as to changing the context of already existing
actions to be interrelated systemically into decision making processes.
This requires institutional changes and additions to a society, instead of
a reliance on clientelistic relationships.

Keeping this in mind, this essay is both a work of 'development' oriented
philosophy as much as it is political strategy. In my mind, these can be
combined in a unified developmental philosophy, which takes political
pressure into account since certain politics can have long term
developmental effects; thus, certain politics can be seen as having a
developmental character.

Visa versa, developmental effects have political effects as well. In
essence, I am arguing that one can consider political effects and the
facilitation of them (in a system of balances) a developmental philosophy.

The essay will deal with only three aspects of what I consider useful in
'working globalization over,' slowly and systematically, to aid a
globalized economy in integrating more moderating and local influences. As
I mentioned, it is based upon a theoretical analysis, of which I will go
into before commenting upon the three areas where I see beneficial social
change. The changes are less ideological and more sociostructural
strategies, taken from an appreciation of how institutions create their own
political ecology, and how political ecologies of actors are affected and
maintained by organizational forms. It is an exploration into how both
influence each other in a long term political process. These strategies can
be widely adopted for many different areas of the world, because they are
facilitation strategies of what is already 'out there' in the world. These
facilitation strategies merely integrate the existing feedback into
interrelated forms which create what I would call a 'sustainable politics'
of interrelated balance. Out of the six problematic areas (listed below)
that my own studies and researches are exploring presently, I am
considering only the first three of greatest importance, because upon them
I would argue, hinge the subsequent long term strategies. The first three
strategies are the ones that the essay considers. Although I have added
more, at this time of writing, the full six are:

    (1) Civic Democratic Institutions (CDI's): creating wider and
    more complex local cultural autonomy as a political
    mobilization force.

    (2) "Hanse Nationalism:" providing a means whereby urban interests
    are systemic power actors on the nation-state level.

    (3) "Affirmative" world financial cooperatives: an MAI response
    utilizing systemic elites and the huge economies of scale
    of the impoverished countries to generate an organization
    which will allow Third World countries to develop along their own
    lines instead of the World Bank's lines of development.

    (4) Rural Financial Structures, embedded in mutualized economies
    of scale, to provide for point (1) and for environmental
    security through political capacity for moderating
    feedback to urban politics and developmental processes.

    (5) Affirmative Democracy Structures, 'fiscal democracy' structures
    which are geared to community level priortization of
    urban governmental budgets--highly popularized
    in Brazil after their 1985 Constitutional change.

    (6) educational structural change.

Each build upon the others in an overall macro strategy which is designed
to meliorate globalized economic centralization and nation-state political
domination by TNC biased politics and the subsequent decline of feedback
from their respective populaces.

There are two 'flanks' to this strategy, those interior to the nation-state
and those exterior to the nation-state. The interior strategies (number 1
and 2) consist of institutionalizing and focusing local culture and
politics in an overall nation-state framework which requires nation-state
organizational structural facilitation as well. The exterior strategy
(number 3) is generally a bulwark to the TNC capital domination of the
'neocolonial' world (the ex-European colonial possessions which have
experience a shift in economic domination to TNC and World Bank derived
development strategies).

As a work of theorizing a 'sustainable politics,' though these ideas are
designed for strategic application to the world at large, the historical
examples and discussion will figure on the United States. This is for three
reasons. As a citizen of the United States, I am more familiar with the
cultural, historical and political milieu of this nation-state. Secondly,
with the central place the United States has in the globalized economy
(detailed below), any examination of the state of the world which fails to
take into account the role of the United States as military and economic
sovereign of the existing system will be very shallow. For these
rationales, my rhetoric will focusing on using the United States as the
running example, though I want it made clear that these ideas were
formulated with a more generalized and abstract level of analysis which
would be applicable to all nation-states potentially. Therefore, this is a
work of theory as much as it is of practice, through it's point is to
develop theory to the extent that it can aid in the formulation of
practice, instead of merely theory for theory's sake. Thirdly, granting the
United States centrality of TNC expansive globalization, political change
in the United States would have the most widely felt repercussions.

This is a short introduction to where I see we are presently. With the
increasingly unopposed neoliberal putsch of transnational corporations and
their respective nation-state governments which abet them, the world's
economy is in increasingly being conducted across international lines, even
for what once would have been a simple 'local' transaction. Transnational
corporations (TNC's) increased in number from 7,000 two decades ago to
37,000 presently (1995 figures). TNC's have two trillion dollars in
property values, and fully one-third of total private sector productive
assets are owned by TNC's worldwide. Remarkably, 30% of world trade is
merely parent-subsidiary transfers between branches of the same TNC, which
solidifies and embeds these paths as linkages of investment flows. This
characteristic of TNC world trade makes TNC oriented trade, overall, more
than the global total trade in goods and services.

Continuing the theme of the United States centrality in this globalizing
economy, the United States is simultaneously the world's largest foreign
investor as well as the largest site for foreign direct investment.
International direct investment (IDI) increased in the 1970's-80's by 10
times, three times faster than the increase in global merchandise exports,
and four times faster than industrial nation-state economies taken as a
single average. [Fry, 1995] It is far from surprising that this economic
dislocation and fluxing in the world could be related to a systemic level
of violence expanding as economics and politics are shorn into two,
something which the United States even is far from immune.

I feel it is required to anchor local politics to local institutional
structures to provide a meliorative balance to the neoliberal political
regime. The populations of (what was once known as) the First World have
seen themselves being more and more unrepresented, as, in the United
States, both the Democratic and the Republican Parties further are removed
to the political 'high-end' market players and corporate sponsorship. There
is a small window of opportunity while the globalized system is yet to be
'formalized' into structures which will by are definition be out of local
or even nation-state political control. I am thinking of the 'quietly
tabled administrative' agendas like the MAI, which moves to place TNC's on
a sovereign legal tier above nation-state political feedback and
nation-state law--a regime where democratic procedure is effectively
censored as 'obstruction.' The nation-state, our political feedback
capacity, is being dismantled.

 So, on the abstract level, what is required is a double flank
'pincer' movement which both pressures globalized capital (in the form
of TNC state bias) from the nation-state level and pressures on globalized
capital financial organizations on the international level.

Yet what structures could provide such systemic pressure? And remain in
place in the face of what would likely be a huge media propaganda blitz
which frames localized interests as misguided or undemocratically inclined?
This highlights the important realm that the media play, especially in the
United States, in forming political opinion through a process of selective
reporting. This is less to insinuate that thoughts are formed by media, yet
the media provide a structural channel through which only a portion of
nation-state news ever gets broadcast or printed, and out of that, the
'culture' of the nation-state only has a small inkling of ideas in which to
popularly mobilize around. Culture serves a 'functional' political aspect
for a society by assuring mobilization material for political movements,
and culture is crippled when frames of discourse which are shared are only
coming from systemic actors. The aspect of selective acting and reporting
has been well described by Crenson in his formulation of non-politics: the
ability of systemic or governmental actors merely to deign to respond
because it would highlight the conflict of systemic interest.[Crenson,
1971] Therefore, the message is merely dropped. This explains the
descending silence upon issues of whether this is a boon or a curse to
democratic procedure, as well as slick packages like 'fast-track' proposals
which are designed to enact formal TNC economics before local actors have
the funds, the ability, or the popularity to stop such actions.

So three major areas where I see that there should be a meliorative
pressure: (1) a manner to address media bias, since the media effects and
rarefies political control, (2) means to provide localized political
pressure which is sustainable on the level of globalized capital dominated
nation-state politics, (3) and a means to provide international pressure on
world financial organizations like the World Bank, which could be said to
be a virtual monopoly organization which sets the terms of development with
the greater part of the Third World being forced to go to such institutions
since there is little competition on that level of economic domination. All
of these could be summarized in one phrase: what is required is a mutually
interrelated means of action on many levels to provide a proactive response
to globalization of economics and assure the increased potential for
national self-destination. This translates into "how can we maintain/create
a democratic procedural system?" Procedures of political process are
important to identify because 'globalization' fails to happen by itself:
one of the secrets of 'market economics' is the role of the state in
underwriting much of the expense of this globalization, out of taxpayer
moneys. In the United States for example, tax moneys go to maintaining and
funding unprofitable private logging operations in national parks, pay for
international advertising budgets for United States TNC's, and assuring
that the TNC's are taxed relatively low compared to individuals, despite
corporate structures being legally considered individuals they fail to pay
the tax rates of individual citizens. In essence, the externalized costs of
globalization are being underwritten by the individual taxpayer. TNC's
'efficiency' rests highly on its ability for others to shoulder its
economic costs, which is a better definition of 'inefficiency.'

The political control of the state is crucial in fostering this novel
globalized economic epoch. In such states, we have seen increasing
ecological degradation and political malaise mixed with increasing levels
of endemic violence. Yet is it to pressure on the state that we can look
for 'solutions,' yet with a twist on the strategic 'point' of mobilizing in
the first place. In the history of the United States, I would argue, the
increasing centralization of government is less a sole product of state-led
drives, and a mutual process which involves continuing pressure from the
grass roots for considering 'regulatory saviors' as a solution (whether
that idea is their own or sold to them is outside the scope of this essay).
My point is that in a strategic sense a nation-state's (or any state's)
citizenry looks to the national level government for solutions for local
problems, and this contributes ironically to their own decentralizing, slow
removal from systemic power. So in light of this, I would add that there
should be some mechanism for assuring that such frames of 'government
regulatory salvation' are appropriately challenged when posed that more
'regulation' will solve something. I say appropriately challenged. This
will be addressed momentarily. This is less a call for complete rejection
of state regulation and more a sense that these ideas are appropriately
weighed for the pro's and con's.

Most of my sense of what may be challenging to some in what I am
describing, is that I am simultaneously having to describe my epistemology
as I go along. Most of those who write and speak, I would venture, are
relying on existing tropes, memes, frames, and teleological suppositions
within their audience and playing off of that. It's already to an extent
'out of the can.' Instead, I am having to package the epistemology,
distribute it around the audience, and then speak. The following is an
experiment in rhetoric as well as historical sociology, because I am having
to deal with existing interpretations. Therefore, I will be defining terms
as I go along.

This leads into a short historical lesson which deals with patterns I see
in world history--what I would call a systemic drift in power relations in
a society. I will be only dealing with one aspect of this in this essay, an
aspect which relates to the essay's drive to strategies for grass roots
interests. In this essay's sense, the basic definition would be the
increasing centralization of political structure and economic structure,
which is dually abetted from grass roots pressure (ironically) as much as
systemic actors desires for more economic wealth, political power or status
prestige. Culturally and crucially, it relies on government level groups
being able to effectually 'co-op' rebellious discourse with a successful
government level solution to dampen upset with the state or some private
actor with more state intercession exchanged for public quiescence. As it
is a political process, there are any number of 'outcome' scenarios,
variations on a theme, though a particularly 'bad scenario' (depending, as
always (and unfortunately), on one's point of view) would be if the
centralization is carried to a great extent the society itself may come
apart through the sheering of all sense of status markings of legitimacy
for the state level government, where the government is seen as
unremediable, and people withdraw and become actively embedded in more
local issues and interests, effectively attempting to blot out of their
thoughts the issues of government. The United States seems to be well on
its way to this outcome.

Unfortunately, politically speaking, this drive for centralization from
both the state and the grass roots rarely leads to anything save a
clientalistic relationship between the impoverished and the elites of
government which soon decays socially, leaving ironically an
organizationally stronger government structure (which was facilitated by
the impoverished) in the hands of those who use it for their own ends--in a
sort of internal colonialization. As the cycles continue, strategies of
organizational mobilization possibilities decline systemically for the
grass roots as they ratchet up past successes or suffer repression. The
problem for this from a democratic procedural standpoint, is that the grass
roots is systemically contributing to their removal from systemic power.

The same pressures for a world government from the base as well as
externalized elites lining up to take advantage of the situation is
beginning to occur, and I worry about the long term ramifications when the
informal clientelism of the elites and their pressure groups decays leaving
a stronger, more centralized, more removed and remote governmental level
organization. On this scale, government would be effectively out of local
and even nation-state political input. Because after the elites ride to
power on a potential ticket of a 'world government for everyone' the same
ebbing away will occur, and people find they have helped construct
something which local politics are unable to touch systemically by
definition. If you split up typologically what this 'world government'
would look like, the centerpiece institutions, like the World Bank and the
international financial sector, are the economic side. The United Nations
can be considered the 'representative' side. Of course each of them are
very particular in their systemic interests, and the degree of
representativeness or of "appropriateness" of them are just discourses
which say that they "promise" to be these things, out to deflect opposition
and centralize power. State legitimacy is always constructed and maintained
in a political process through cultural discourses, where legitimacy is
bought with, sadly, what amounts to grass roots supported co-option and
externalization of them in a politcal process that relies on clientelistic
relationships with power.

Much of my research goes into discussing and creating a typology for
systemic shifts of power relations in societies. With the tabling of ideas
like the MAI, the connections between the base pressured discourse/co-oped
discourse government side and the economic side are being merged, just like
they were in the smaller sense on the nation-state level. Two examples of
this systemic drift created from the overall full input of a rarefacting
political ecology are the United States in the early 1900-1930's era, as
well as Britain in the latter 1800's when the 'nouveaux riches' of the
capitalist industrialists joined in power with the British aristocracy. I
would go further and add that the political and economic consolidation of
feudalism, whether one traces that to the last centuries of Rome or to the
1100-1300 C. E. period, occurred with the selfsame systemic drift of the
entire political ecology. Economic dislocation and environmental
degradation can abet this yet it is far from the only means whereby this
political ecology wide phenomenon will occur.

Notice I am continuously saying that this is a political process, meaning
it is feasibly 'up for grabs.' Yet I would argue that this quality of
'openness' of outcomes is unrelated to the 'openness' of the political
process to different methods of approach at the time, since I am arguing
that the systemic drift occurs out of the increasing rarefaction of the set
of strategies of political possibility for the impoverished, as they
further and further contribute to the agglomeration of political and
economic power. This is ironically the very path which leads them to
further look to such governmental organizations for addressing their equity
and social justice concerns, when they are contributing to social
stratification of those concerns in a systemic sense. The systemic drift is
the rarefaction of whole sets of strategies and capacities of a society,
effectively centralizing the interests of state expansion drives with the
clientelism of the impoverished. I would argue that the political potential
of the impoverished making a successful push for political representation
wanes while simultaneously this waning of their influence makes they call
upon the centralization of government services more and more. This I tend
to describe less as a cause/effect relationship and more as a
self-reiterating process of feedback potentials. In other words, the waning
political potentiality of local grass roots strength contributes to their
increasingly dependent relationship on government. Looking at this from a
strategic sense, the problematic point becomes this: elite co-option of
cultural frames of grass roots action contributes to this by dampening any
call for structural changes in the systemic political systems which
continuously abetted and helped to foster this in the first place. So, a
means to effectively secure local cultural action of framing and of
discourse of what the 'issues' are from a local instead of a disassociated
elite view is important, from which they can decide for themselves (within
the nation-state) what they wish--with minimal (or at least recognizable)
externalized input attempts to influence the direction and terms of the
debate. I would posit that the nascent capitalistic systemic elites'
discourse when it pressed for state power was exactly the same. In both the
United States and France, the greater part of the rural population
ironically wanted a completely different outcome than what they got, and
the government got elites with different policy interests than which they
had rebelled for in the first place. [LeFebvre, 1989; Gross, 1990] The
French population wanted the king to aid them against the economic
dislocation and 'commercialization' occurring in the rural areas which was
increasingly impoverishing (and starving) them. The rurals of both future
nation-states (most of the population) wanted a more circumscribed life and
they rebelled in the name of what they hoped would be a regime which would
defend these ideas, if they rebelled for anything at all.

It is important to recall that these ideas for systemic change are less
'just harmless and unconnected suggestions' which float in and out randomly
in a culture, and more that they are proposed by certain groups and
represent certain interests attempts to influence the debate's framing of
goals, intentions, oppositions, and friendships. Political ideas are firmly
grounded in a sense in the history of past ideas and relationships, in the
culture at large [Billig, 1995], as much as they are dependent upon how the
multifarious interpretations and counter moves of other groups react to
them in the present moment. [Oliver, 1984]. Many ideas are tabled by
systemic actors and organizations looking for political influences.

To understand the systemic drift is to then proffer means to meliorate and
decentralize the process of the rarefying of political pressure, by
detailing strategies which would 'hold open' a plurality of mechanisms for
achieving political pressure, instead of increasingly having to rely on the
clientelism of the gatekeepers of the increasingly rarefied and solitary
path to get the state's attention. In other words, 'first dimensional
power' relationships [Lukes, 1974] are something which any 'sustainable
politics' should move to minimize, on the level of 'methods' of achieving
power. When there is a wider array of methods to achieve political and
cultural power, first-dimensional 'gatekeeper' power dependencies are
reduced and externalized groups and interests have more potential for
pressuring the state, and in these situations systemic drift is forestalled
and held in abeyance. With such a plurality of political methods I would
argue, the political ecology could avoid the increasing 'feudalization'
which I see in this systemic drift--the elision of the political and the
economical systems being tied to a centralized government and the
increasing centralization and thinness of mobilizing cultural frames and
systemic actors. I will address this concern first in the interior realm of
the nation-state, addressing a strategic solution for voicing localized
cultural frames, followed by a discussion of nation-state level changes of
processes which can keep this feedback going.

(1) CDI: Civic Democratic Institutions:
Preparing and Maintaining Local Input in Nation-State Level Politics and
Cultural Frames Cultural discourses are inherently political, which is
shown in much of the political sociology of culture literature [Mellucci,
1995; Billig, 1995; Nash, 1989; Levine and Mainwaring, 1989; Navarro,
1989]. It can either make or break a successful mobilization to have a
widely shared sense a fortiori of activities and interpretations of the
world. Especially in nation-states, political parties tend to be the
reifying structures with the widest participation, and thus these
nation-state political parties both aid in defining nation-state culture,
as well as prescribing it to suit systemic interests in the aforementioned
systemic drift which leaves local areas shortchanged culturally speaking.
Crenson's understanding of non-politics is readily witnessed in the
selectivity of these national-political parties in discussing local issues.
The CDI aids in local area formulation of their own political cultural
frames and discourses, based on their community interests which are created
out of their local political processes.

The Civic Democratic Institution form (CDI) is a structure for defensibly
maintaining and registering local sentiment in a form of a 'living poll,'
if you will, recognizing any individuals who are admired or culturally
trusted in a degree in social relations. The Appendix One of this essay is
a copy of a web-published document (at www.sit.wisc.edu/~mrkdwhit/cdi3.htm)
describing the functions, features, and structures of the CDI.

One of the rationales of for creating the CDI was to embed organizationally
different groups together in some degree (in my first thoughts) in an urban
context, because I was initially worried about increasing social
bifurcations in not only this country but worldwide. And following from
this sociopolitical isolation comes what I saw as a contributing factor for
the nation-state failing its ability to address democratic and equity
issues successfully because it was so divided. Bonacich's arguments for the
systemic effects of divided labor markets comes close to my observations,
[Bonacich, 1972] about the importance of social cultural forms of 'split
labor markets' facilitating or debilitating particular political cultures.
I wanted to stir up the pot a bit--yet only in a way that the people
themselves could keep the stirring continuing, as well as in a way that
would lead to moderation in politics instead of reactionary politics.

Throughout the description of the CDI in this essay, I will be
using urban sites as the primary examples of where this would be useful.
Because of the degree of sociospatial separation as well as 'ethnically'
split labor markets, people thus lack of ability to organize a localized
coalitional politics in a wider sense in an urban context. People exist
in different networks sociospatially in an urban context. [Fischer, 1975]
Thus the CDI would be most useful in urban areas, though it is in rural
areas, because of their multiplexity of network connection, where it may
have a lower 'critical mass' to be seen as useful. [Marwell and Oliver,

I should explain two terms at this point: multiplex and simplex
relationships. Multiplex relationships are most likely to be found in rural
areas, where particular individuals may share many different overlapping
roles with other people in the vicinity. For example, a father-son-daughter
business, in which they attend the same religious organization as most of
the people who employ their services, who may be indeed the very people who
loaned them the money to start the business. This is one complex example of
a 'multiplex' social environment--where individual relationships may be
more likely to carry many different roles, than, say, in an urban context.
Simplex relationships occur readily in an urban context. In urban sites,
the population density allows for great organizational growth and the
potential of individuals social relationships to become very splayed in
urban space and very compartmentalized. More choice results in
relationships which are simplex--and people are more likely to have only
one level of relationship, like for instance a cab driver and his or her
fare, or an economic exchange at a fast food restaurant. Multiplex and
simplex relationships make it easier to comprehend what the CDI designs to
do: make urban simplex relationships more multiplex in character, which
provides for less 'critical mass' required to achieve unified cultural and
political pressures. The CDI acts as an 'introduction service' for
urbanites, separated by the innately splaying sociospatial networks of
urban areas and organizational life, and out of which a more complex
cultural milieu is recognized. With the increasingly complexity of the
urban culture comes less likelihood to be swayed by external solutions to
their problems. With a more multiplex coalitional structure which the CDI
aims to facilitate, community organizations become local systemic actors.
From this localized context, they can network with other cities for wider
nation-state level politics. This is discussed in the next section.

The CDI conception is so webbed into social feedback effects it's rather
germane to discuss it in terms of what it does, than what it 'is.' The CDI
'grounds' coalition building into existing cultural networks. It uses
existing thoughts and feelings towards other citizens, pools them together
and delivers a tally to the people of whom they find representative or
admire, as a group. This brings local politics into integration with local
cultural forms, and makes state elites work to maintain their power by
reducing first-dimensional power relationships culturally speaking. Instead
of local actors working to get the state's or a political party's
attention, the latter groups have to acquiesce more when there is a
stronger and more vocal local cultural milieu which is less dependent and
more resistant to external ideas about what is 'good policy.' The CDI
balances out the highly unequal systemic power which occurs between a
low-input, simplex urban politics and powerful nation-state political
parties. The CDI creates a mobilizing forum on the local level which is
designed to embed local groups in a long term process of coalition building
as a social institutional process. This process is tailor made to the local
cite because the actors which are recognized are selected for several
traits on the organizational level of the CDI. The CDI makes sure they are

    (1) popular amongst various groups instead of merely their own
    'political machine,'

    (2) with a cultural sense of creating an intermediary and facilitating
    role in cultural sense, instead of creating an ideological reactionary

    (3) and in addition, the CDI makes sure they are personally motivated
    to fulfill this role without any incentives besides the status recognition
    which becomes a symbolic rallying frame for them being framed in a social
    and political capacity by the CDI recognition.

The CDI aims at popularizing local political coalitional development as a
cultural process, within cultural networks. The CDI has nothing to do with
changing government structure, or changing voting law, etc. These winnowing
aspects of the CDI are effected by its dual-tier voting structure, and the
turnover period of one CDI is short enough (one year) to allow for issues
to develop as soon as they become widely pertinent, instead of growing
unobserved and unaddressed by government and exploding into violent
conflict. The CDI voting mechanism is described in Appendix One, and I turn
the reader to examine it further there. Other CDI-like forms (or forums, in
this case) in operation around the world are the Cuban political
'affirmative' political structure of localized political input, and the
fiscal budgetary 'affirmative democracy' of Porto Alegre in Rio Grande du
Sul, Brazil. [Navarro, 1997]. Including the CDI in this group, they have
several uniting features:

    (1) a mix of direct and representative features, to create a middle

    (2) they attempt to get around political party formation which
    divides a populace on a local level by an integrationist
    and coalitional input form of operation,

    (3) by a means to institutionalize coalition building as a political
    means of integrating community level cultural organizations
    with local government level structures 'culturally,'
    thus minimizing sociospatial separation amongst different networks.

Though I mentioned in point (2) that they attempt to get around ideological
conceptions, I mean in the sense, that they are structured to be
deliberative political arenas instead of combative public factions (which I
would argue exist only when they are left out of the deliberative process
in some sense, in the past).

If the political theorist Goodnow and his ideas had been successful instead
of had been co-opted in the Progressive Era of the United States (circa
1900), urban politics might have been quite different. His ideas of an
urban administrative structure which moved to integrate local political
input into urban governmental structure in a deliberative and consular
sense would have been cut of the same cloth as the abovementioned three.
[Frisch, 1982] The CDI 'holds open' the possibility for effective
democratic structures, which ideological and identity politics normatively
closes and separates, leading to a further debilitation of the political
democratic process, as systemically those unconnected with the government
structure face only their small groups of identity or ideological adherents
as their audiences against the state.

I was particularly interested in the 'whipping' cultural effects of
unrepresentative political victories due to the lack of other candidates or
discrimination, etc. There are two major choices in situations like these:
wait, and in the next election elect someone else; or, if there is nothing
resembling a group willing to challenge, just sitting back and being
frustrated. The first option, I would argue is less based on issues
therefore and more capable of being based on a cycle of revenge. This can
easily be manipulated to get people into power who merely have to say "I'm
the exact opposite of so-and-so, and will do the exactly opposite of
so-and-so,' and with little other strategic choice for the individual
voter, they generally vote in droves for this challenging candidate. And
what occurs generally once this 'challenger' candidate gets into power? It
becomes obvious that they have merely used the public's lack of choice of
other venues of reaction for their own ends. Generally they do nothing
different, and the cycle of the 'false challenger' begins again--becuase of
a lack of political method choice. One is forced to vote 'for' someone when
one actually would rather more directly like to vote 'against' a particular
person. The CDI integrates this, described below, in a 'voter veto.'

The second option: the disgruntled frustration, of saying to hell with it
all, has been the option of most of the United States population for many
years. This is related to a lack of recognized leaders. This is not related
I would argue to a sense that there are no leaders. There are. Yet many
potential leaders realize that the game as it is is a losing one.

There ar two intents of the CDI: one is symbolical, and the other is
deliberative. The symbolical is described first. The CDI moves to make
these leaders visible in the background without having them to do anything.
It just recognizes them, and moves to recognize them with a facilitations
role, which is 'seen' as actively taking on a social frame of recognition,
taking on a status symbol which becomes a potential rallying point. The CDI
'election' has shown symbolically to the people at large that these people
already have an informal 'party' following. This is the symbolic intent of
the CDI.

The deliberative intent of the CDI is recognizing these individuals in
addition as a cultural 'forum' group. Their recognition is both individual
and civic. The CDI is nothing like a governmental structure, it is a
cultural body of admired citizens--the whole spectrum.

Dealing with the symbolic context once more, it is the spectrum only of
those who are 'widely' admired. In other words, the CDI attempts to
disfranchise machine politics structural hold on cultural creation. That's
a mouthful, so I will restate. I am saying that political parties tend to
develop identities for nation-states, for cities, for people as individuals
because they are the social status system as much as the nation-state
political participants. And in time, a simulacrum develops where the
'culture' becomes the feedback which the political actors have selectively
listened to, since everyone else who is ignored either goes hoarse, or just
shuts up. Either way, a system develops between what official culture is
and what politics is. Both reinforce each other. The CDI aims to include
local systemic power in this official cultural capacity of discourse. The
CDI moves to create a way to sustain a coalitional based recognition system
which is wider that what the political status quo would allow for their
conceptions of what the 'culture' is. In other words, the CDI wants to
widen the cultural recognition, which would move the political structures
to adapt over time. The CDI wants to 'hold open' the cultural coalitional
'channel' of discourse as an option.

Continuing this, what about the racists, the fascists, extremists, etc.?
Wouldn't they get equal voice? Extremists would have to pass the litmus
test of the second round of voting, where the longer term of nine months
voting meshes with the published tallies. These tallies allow people to
vote against the people they hate, instead of indirectly finding someone
else to vote for (who is only there mobilizing and capitalizing upon the
widely shared opposition to this other person). The CDI just says that
voting can cut both ways--both for or against these recognitions. This
creates a nice, wide group of centrists, who don't lean either way.
Centrists? Yet doesn't that edit out of cultural recognition anyone
interested in change? No. A quote from Max Weber may be opportune at this
point, concerning external social selection pressures within organizations
which lead to the 'organizational cream of the crop' being the least
definitive elements possible as to satisfy more constituencies.

The fact that hazard rather than ability plays so large a role is not alone
or even predominately owning to the "human, all too human" factors, which
naturally occur in the process of . . .selection [in an organizational
context]. It would be unfair to hold the personal inferiority of faculty
members or educational ministries responsible for the fact that so many
mediocrities undoubtedly play an eminent role at the universities. The
predominance of mediocrity is rather due to the laws of human cooperation,
especially of the cooperation of several bodies. . . .

A counterpart are the events at the papal elections, which can be traced
over many centuries and which are the most important controllable examples
of a selection [in an organizational context]. The cardinal who is said to
be the 'favorite' only rarely has a change to win out. The rule is rather
that the Number Two cardinal or the Number Three wins out. The same holds
for the President of the United States. [Weber, 1958]

Recall the the CDI individuals are not brought together out of
organizational politics, and are more akin to a slow, private accumulation
of votes over the first voting period of nine months. This crates a highly
diverse body of recognized people unaffected by organizational winnowing to
mediocre persons or persons who have been designed to 'fit' in the existing
cultural system. The second tier of voting publicizes their relative
standing to each other, and allows people to vote for people they had
forgotten to vote for before, or in the particular case of the CDI, winnow
out those they despise by voting against them. Since the voter can vote for
as many (for or against) as he or she pleases, the pressure to come up with
one (mediocre and predictable) candiate) is minimized. The idea of the CDI
is to develop intermediaries, those whose appearance is relatively
unclouded by massive popularity or infamy, since these people will most
likely have just as many people who would like to see them disappear as
they would like to have them recognized further. With a roster of
intermediaries, recognized as individuals and as a tacit group, the
organizational politics can develop from there in a political process
within which these intermediaries can decide upon what are the major
concerns of their civic area without having a great deal of systemic input
or state-connected people involved, thus more likely to speak their minds
instead of upholding an image of what they feel they have to represent. The
same principles of intentionally minimizing the social repercussions and
thus allowing for greater citizen honesty of conscience were effective in
the representative debates on the Constitution of the United States in the

In the CDI, legitimacy comes from their personal vote totals, and no one is
running against anyone else. After the individual recognition, the
organizational politics develop off a very different and more complex
systemic base than public power structures in society. The CDI designed
with the external effect of it as much as the organizational qualities. But
what about the lump of centrists? Isn't that the definition of politically
inert? Moderation? Doesn't that maintain the status quo?

I have had this argument before. Presently, we are not living in an epoch
of centrist led status quo. We are living in an era of extremist led status
quo--allowed due to co-opting of local cultural frames for uncultural
interests. The present status quo is not actively maintained by centrists.
It is maintained by the continuing successful appeals to extremists--from
the age of Greek tyranny to the present 'wrapping oneself in the flag' of
the Republicans. It would seem that centrism is intentionally and
structurally avoided and deselected against in the present organization of
the nation state, and unrepresentative political ecologies develop which
maintain this process.

I have already found out that my definition of moderation is perhaps quite
different than what it normatively represents in public speech--maintaining
the status quo. Personally, I consider the status quo as a very radical
polity indeed. It fails to deserve the term 'conservative' or 'moderate'.
It is dangerous to allow it to continue 'unmoderated' by democratic input.
If there is one discourse switch I would feel be of great use is
considering the existing status quo as a radical and one sided polity,
capable of being maintained because of a lack of political mediation and
moderation. Thus, 'moderation' in my sense is a sense of increasing
complexity and less issuing out of ideological platforms, and more coming
out of cultural networks and humanizing socialization which brings groups
through the representatives of the CDI together socially on a local
context. As I mention in the Appendix, the CDI is an 'introduction service'
for generating local consensus and coalitional based political pressures.

It's a strategic and solvable problem I argue on how to keep these
democratic channels from 'sealing' into formal ideological frameworks,
which can be co-opted by external elites (out of the urban context of
groups without representation). The complexity, the shifting quality, and a
system of generating multiplex relationships in an urban context thus
making it difficult for clientalistic elites to swoop in and take advantage
of economic desperation or of desire for 'solutions' by ideological mimicry
of 'local values' platforms. The CDI creates and holds effectively 'open' a
process of coalitional politics.

Power wins and will always win. We have to find a way to join in its
deliberations on a long term basis. We have to find a way to disrupt power
by participating in it, thus pulling its dimensionality of relations to a
more local level. But in disrupting power, on the other hand, we should
respect that a society will only go so far before it will want 'normalcy.'
Even if that normalcy was a prison, it was home. A great deal of power is
always given to those who promise stability, and people will vote for any
groups who want to promise it. So if we upset security issues, we will have
lost. We have to walk between these two poles of disrupting power and
respecting a society's desire for stability. Everything strategically I
propose takes that into account. The CDI assures that it will be utilized
as an intermediary force structurally speaking. It affects a change in the
interactions of how politics comes together on the local level, and thus,
it is one step toward the 'moderation--'the democraization--of the radical
neoliberal regime we presently face, held together by unrepresentative
media structures warping our ability to communicate issues to ourselves and
unrepresentative state power arrangements that preference artificical
corporate citizens over human citizens.

So the CDI is both conservative and radical: conservative in the sense that
it is coalitional and non-extremist and based on localism and community
issues; and radical only in the sense that it actually asks local people to
participate in democratic procedures. This I have defined as a moderating
influence, considering the present status quo a radical and extremist view
which only exists because of lack of systemic power to challenge it. The
sociopolitical effect of the CDI is to dismantle sociospatial distance
between social networks, to help generate solidarity and coalitional
consenus building structures in society. Ideologies of a more general urban
interest can develop due to the CDI holding 'open' the channel of local
coalition building for politics in the wider political ecology, instead of
the factionalism and clientelism we witness and are told to consider

Merely to look at the structure of the CDI misses the point, because I am
looking at its effect on informal networks, socialization, ideological
creation--instead of just the formal structure of the CDI. I am looking at
the wider social effects of the CDI's recognition process on political

And best of all, no one has to force people to do anything. This is
optional. Research on incentives say that incentives for action (especially
political action) attracts a population sample which may be more interested
in their own individual benefit and may be even opposed to the politics per
se which the private incentive was designed to get them involved in in the
first place. The CDI makes sure that the 'cream of the crop' is
selected--those that want to participate, and who are motivated themselves
(instead of motivated by solely private incentives).

I am describing the CDI and Hanse Nationalism which follows in terms of
urban politics just for rhetorical compactness. In the text of the CDI
(Appendix One) I mention that this would be useful for facilitating
coalitions and networking in both rural and urban areas. So I see a role
for the CDI in 'both' areas, through they are interrelated in the same
political economy despite being to some extent separate cultural arenas.
Possibly due to denser and more multiplex relationships in rural areas, the
critical mass [Marwell and Oliver, 1984] to introduce the CDI would be
inherently easier for people to achieve.

As many in political sociology would express, cultural frames of discourse
are highly important as bases for politics in all societies. In a sense
what is cultural is profoundly related to the interaction with the
structural. [Billig, 1995; Nash, 1989], because it provides formal network
mobilization material against the structural when the time is sensed to be
opportune. The CDI is a structure for facilitating local and nation-state
political coalitional building from a different systemic level--a sited
consensus politics which can develop into a localized systemic power.
Developing a vocabulary to define structures as having externalized
political ecology effects, and particular political ecologies as
perpetuating particular structures is one area where we require more

To summarize, the CDI uses existing cultural networks to build political
coalitions, and it brings people together to make their own bridges between
each other. It embeds politics into culture, instead of political machines
serving us what out 'culture' is. And the CDI makes sure through a double
blind and double round voting system that people with political machines
are dampened as a factor and held back. They are either swamped by the
inability to keep up their advertising throughout the long nine months it
takes to accumulate voting totals in the first round, or since it is so
easy to vote against anyone who attempts to machine together their
candidacy of huge campaigns will be deselected as a waste of money since
people can veto this person without having to wait for someone else
appearing to vote 'for.' It gives the veto effectively to the people
directly, instead of the people depending on a champion to oppose the other
(perhaps previous?) champion they elected or recognized. In other words,
all the advertising and machine politics in the world is marginalized,
since the CDI allows people who lack a candidate or a political machine,
merely to vote against a person they want to see ousted from popularity.
This is what they wanted to do anyway--just see that this person doesn't
win. The present strategy which the system selects for is forcing them to
back someone else equally powerful. Is that a check on power, if you have
to have recourse to it to deal with power? Better to put the veto into the
people's hands for cultural issues. And it is harder for local leaders to
sell out, since they are part of local group networks. The CDI moves to
give people veto against what they consider empty promises and lies without
depending upon a 'false challenger' to express their opposition, as well as
simultaneously networking people in a forum whom the citizenry has
recognized as capable of a intermediary role. It devolves ideological
politics to a more sociospatially cultural network orientation in society
which can hold much more complexity. Furthermore, the CDI tends to instill
more of a faith in democratic procedure than national political machines,
multimillion dollar ad campaigns, and their corporate sponsors (both
Democrat and Republican) can afford to purchase for themselves. It develops
an ideological politics more recognizably localized which considers local
citizens as a political force, instead of merely a market for distantly
derived political platforms. The CDI moves to claim cultural discourses for
local areas, and in a sense, it is an institutional 'third space' [Soja,
1997] form which makes the city culturally capable of reproducing itself
closer to the era of pre-capitalism. Pre-capitalism, the city itself was
much more of a 'third space' by definition. It was a group of people before
the rich and the poor began to stratify sociospatially in the city and
communicate only within the system of worksites. The CDI vivifies urban
culture and urban politics by socially developing an urban discourse which
moderates the sociospatial network separation of capitalism in the city.
The postmodern culture is highly related to this political frustration and
lack of cultural integration I would posit. These in turn effect capacities
for mobilizing for equity issues.

It is the wider political ecological effect of the CDI political process
strategy, within the nation-state context, which I will develop in the next

(2) Hanse Nationalism: Balancing
    Local and National Identities and Politics
With the national-poltical parties presently moving to the 'high-end' of
the political market of TNC influence, there has opened a chasm of
unrepresented interests at the nation-state level. This makes it an ideal
time to press for something which will contribute to democratic procedural
maintenance in a long term sense. This political press is less policy
oriented and more a question of a process change which will have widespread
effects. Due to these widespread effects, it has a high return to its
initial involvement.

This change is for limited parliamentarian electoral voting laws on the
nation-state level. This small change will open up the political process of
the nation-state of the United States, which has long maintained only two
majoritarian parties as the only contenders and translators of nation-state
power. As such they were in the role of gatekeeper of the only means to
achieve nation-state power--a monopoly arrangement structurally speaking.
In a limited parliamentarian electoral regime, the Democrats and the
Republicans will be unable to hold back the localist political parties in
their desires for coalition building for nation-state power. The Founding
Fathers of the United States failed to countenance what would happen when
national political parties rendendered separate state governmental
machinery within the sway of one or the other national political
organization. A majoritarian system of voting has translated itself into to
the institutionlization of two parties and has jammed the tripartite
separation of powers in the government structure.

Yet how can we get this networking of urban interests in the CDI to a
nation-state level? In simultaneous strategies:

    (1) the preservation (and creation) of the local coalitional form
    as a sustainable political form through the CDI strategy,

    (2) a press for limited parliamentarianism (meaning voting law
    changes)on the nation-state level, either through existing third party
    coalition 'one-issue' pressure in a special campaign, or through
    networking with multi-urban politics.

For case (1), the CDI strategy will assure that these nation-wide
expressions of localist interests remain influenced by local interests,
instead of merely becoming co-opting cultural frames and supporting
existing political processes of unrepresentative politics. The CDI holds
open the local coalitional base of politics, keep it from being co-opted
culturally as well as organizationally from externalized nation-state
political parties, and thus holds open in a wider sense the ability of
nation-state coalition building.

Yet limited parliamentarianism on the nation-state level electoral laws,
case (2), is required to add the 'pull' from the nation-state to make the
system of nation-state politics a venue which allows for these smaller
parties and interests to have a place in nation-state politics as separate
systemic interests. Otherwise they will take their place in the graveyard
of all third party contenders of the United States which attempt to move to
the nation-state level. In other words, getting established in power at the
nation-state level is a great gift in the subsequent election cycle for
third parties, something that none of them have ever experienced in the
United States.

Parliamentarianism is perhaps the only unifying principle which the various
third parties in existence presently in the United States could ever hold
as some sort of common platform (in their small capacities, kept from
coalition building and developing a novel democratic procedural form for
nation-state politics). As an ideological call of unity in this diversified
bunch, parliametarianism is perhaps the only unifier of diversity.

I suggest that parliamentarianism should be a public pressure rhetoric for
a one-issue platform which could unite all third parties. It would be in
their collective as well as individual interest. It is not as vague as
'oppose globalization' and it has a very clear and understandable message
of "what to do". It's proactive, instead of reactive strategy. As such, it
will engender much more support, especially from already existing third
parties like the Greens, the New Party, the Socialists, and the
Libertarians. They all have to team up, less on ideological agreement, and
more of a sense that as a group all third party pressure would be useful
for pressing for something which third parties as individual groups could
utilize: parliamentarian electoral laws. They will all disagree of course
politically, yet can agree on the desire for getting power. In doing so,
they aid setting up a novel channel of politics for later: the formal
government coalition.

I will define a few terms. Majoritarian party: I am talking solely about
the United States in this instance--of either the Democratic Party or the
Republican Party. I call them the same--majoritarian party--because of
electoral laws which basically keep the playing field for national level
politics out of political form change by giving the citizenry basically two
rather evenly matched parties, which have come to reify the laws for their
approach to politics to their mutual advantage. This is contrary to what I
would define as a working democratic procedural system--one which has
several methods to reach the nation-state exercise of power. The
majoritarian parties monopolize the sole path to the nation-state level and
thus, create a very unrepresentative regime. Historically, the dual
majoritarian parties in addition have the cultural role in the nation-state
political ecology of 'splitting' the local 'working' vote which could,
aided with the CDI and Hanse Nationalism, be welded together into a working
counterpart to these majoritiarn parties on the national-level, effectively
balancing the neoliberal TNC-biased nation-state government in our present
era. The electoral law system calls for this majoritarian structural
outcome in the political ecology through 'winner take all' elections and
makes this the only political ecology outcome possible in the United
States, and it has nothing to do with the way the people vote or the
percentages of their support. In terms of law, either one of this party
will win, or the other will win because there are the only contenders which
have established cultural primacy, and they maintain it through the overall
poltical ecology and voting laws that select against other contenders
gaining a 'toehold' in government representation for the next election
cycle. Majoritarian parties as a group have made it very difficult for
third parties to register as nation-state contenders as a consequence, as
majoritarian parties have set the laws to levels that only they can reach.

I am using the word 'parliamentarianism in three senses:

    (1) a politically formal method of using the governmental structure
    and (not the political party caucus floor) for what the government was
    designed for, registering competing claims in formal coalitional
    building (instead of what I would describe as the informal coalitional
    building in political parties which then take office, yielding smaller
    voices out of the dialogue of majoritarian political parties

    (2) a word denoting a wider political plurality of parties on all
    levels of government.

    (3) As a policy, it calls for a change in the nation-state electoral
    laws to allow for 'parliamentarian' (sense 1 and 2) elections, instead
    of only having 'winner take all' election laws which is what is in
    place presently, which select for maintaining the majoritarian parties
    as the only power contenders on the nation-state level, as well as
    maintaining a single path model to nation-state level power which
    reifies only those particular interests which can network to that
    level of power politics by themselves.

The CDI can be seen as a feedback mechanism for achieving
parliamentarianism. Parliamentarianism both opens the door to third party
coalitional forms as well as the further extrapolation off interlinked
local systemic interests. This nation-state level platform of particular
urban systemic interests I would call Hanse Nationalism. Why have the CDI
anyway if the parliamentary quality of the electoral laws could generate a
sustainable political ecology for third party interests? The CDI is an
assurance that local coalitional forms of culture and politics are not
ignored by the ideological platforms of nation-state political parties,
third parties included. It is yet another means of pluralizing the
democratic procedural forms. The CDI is a structural mechanism to assure
that these local political ideas remain widely representational and the CDI
assures that cultural frames are maintained as complex as possible so a
sense of embedded and multiplex citizenship on the local level can develop
instead of just a political party consumer culture which can easily co-op
urban sites and lead to a sense of systemic drift described earlier.
Coalitional and multiplex interests on the local level provide a means to
give voice to the sociospatially separated interests in urban areas which
lack a political organization of their own urban politics which can have a
different systemic base. Urban sites normally house the most impoverished
people of a society and the most politically disfranchised. A democratic
procedural mechanism which leaves out these impoverished and their social
issues, would be leaving them to fend in a systemic power world of
organizations which would only temporarily and clientelistically see fit
they were included.

Yet one might ask, are you considering the nation-state a vestigial and
fading structure with this Hanse Nationalism? Actually, I certainly hope I
avoid ever implying such a thing. In my view, Hanse Nationalism only would
work within the overall nation-state as a superstructure, as well as within
the political ecology which allows successful nation-state level third
parties. Think of it perhaps, as a deus et machina, something which
operates for democracy within the nation-state, balancing/leveling out the
political power to where the people are in the cities, instead of only
where the political machines want to operate. The political machines
(national political parties deserve to be called machines more than the
local urban machines ever did) still will be operating I feel. I am looking
at them as a resource, and as nothing which is inherently corrupt, just
corruptible without any political competition. We require a highly
pluralized political ecology where there is more than one method--being
associated with a majoritarian party--of getting to the national
government. With Hanse Nationalism as a democratic procedural path and
third party coalitions, majoritarian parties will be finished as
gatekeepers to the nation-state.

Actually 'Hanse Nationalism,' if one thinks about it as a term, is an
oxymoron. There was nothing nationalistic about the European Hanse (from
which I drew this term). There were a highly fluid formalization of mutual
trading networks which developed their own regulatory power upon which
merchants and could press on the level of the state for political power.
This is what I see occurring if urban areas can generate a superstructure
for voicing their power in the state, and keep themselves from being
co-opted. Their 'voice' I would argue, would be the commonalties of
experience they could capitalize upon, if the national playing field was
open to the allowance of third (forth, fifth) parties, which would allow
them as urban sites to network their interests as well.

The way it is presently in the United States, with majoritiarn parties as
the only mechanism to get to the nation-state, the political result for any
call of systemic change will be apportioned and split effectively by the
dual majoritarian parties--rendering it moot--with perhaps some for the
third party which calls for the change. This is how, in an organizational
sense, the United States has become one of the least democratic of the
'democracies' because any effective local democracy is either ignored or
filtered out of reaching the nation-state level of power because they are
unable to develop national organizations which can sustain themselves.
Majoritarian parties have 'grown' into the niches which the electoral laws
of 'winner take all' require.

This aspect of political ecology effects of governmental structure is
something which should be added to any theorization of a balance of power
in a society or a government. One has to look at the political ecology
effects of laws and organizations and structures of socialization as much
as 'formal' government if one wants to comprehend the workings of a
political system. Returning to the Hanse of pre-nation-state Europe for the
moment, when capitalist groups came into power in the disturbances of the
late 1700's to late 1800's, they chucked the localized Hanse conceptions. I
am saying that the Hanse networks, in a structural sense, had some highly
beneficial structural points which can be extrapolated into present day
politics, in the United States as well as in any nation-state organization
which is experiencing great inequities because of massive urbanization
without much political representation. The positive points:

    (1) structural politics
    (instead of ideological, or at least 'local
    ideological'), so they stick around based on local interests;

    (2) maintains localism and politics
    (and thus embedded economics
    [Granovetter, 1985] around urban sites, allows for coalitioning
    as an ongoing urban process between cities as well as
    within individual cities. Organize power in cities and one keeps
    economics there as well, instead of disembodying it to TNC's.

    (3) population concentrations and stratification in urban sties leave
    a great many impoverished people waiting for organization, without any
    power or linkages to the formal system of power. The ethnic enclave
    history of the United States cities and urban political power, and how
    these local forms challenged the political sovereignty of nation-state
    organizations is actually 'political' history of the United States. It
    is in urban sites where there is a dearth of organizational
    facilitation, which would be networked with the CDI and slowly tabled
    to the nation-state level with a minimal political party co-option.

A good critique would be that the Hanseatic qualties of city representation
and urban political power in the nation state will be devisive. How will
they work together to make a Hanse Nationalism out of their varied urban
interests? The 'nationalistic,' or supra-local quality of this Hanse
Nationalism will come from the existence of the nation-state as a realm of

I would like to see the local as much as the nation level of politics
balanced. Both can go awry and to extremes I recognize. This is why I
propose melding urban power structures into nation-state level
structures--to counterbalance each other and derive the benefits of both
systems of power--the wider identity and interests of nationalism and the
recognition of highly local power as a national institutioal force in
politics, instaed of only majoritarian parties.

So, "Hanse Nationalism" means Hanse (parochial localism) and the
nation-state (linked to larger structures), each moderating the other, by
basically creating structures which integrate local politics and allow them
to network their concerns as local entities into national issues and
pressures, based on the ideological common issues which they will develop
if given the political ecological space to develop a nationalist level

The historical clientelistic nation-state majoritarian parties in the
United States are of a different economic and cultural positionality base
than from where the Hanse Nationalism pressures would be deriving. This can
be seen throughout the past 20 years as localized urban politics has become
more of a site for consensus building and political experimentation in the
United States--become highly multicultural. Yet the national level
interests have failed to congeal precisely because of 'glass ceiling' of
'winner take all' elections that keeps majoritarian parties in sole power.
I feel that it is simple. The basic survial of the United States as a
democracy depends upon widening systemic power and integration of more
local multicultural interests on the national level of power. Otherwise,
the fabric of society will continue to fray without a sense of
representation at the national level.

Yet there is a role for majoritarian parties to play in Hanse Nationalism.
One important note is that, ironically, large parties are a future resource
in the *maintenance* of parliamentarianism, as long as the political
ecology works to make them competitors in splitting ideological appeals
against parliamentarianism. Parliamentarianism and majoritarian parties can
balance each other, each checking the other's abuses of power. Presently,
there is nothing to check the abuses of majoritarian power. With more
political choice of method, political culture will be less oriented toward
clientelistic relationships.

Yet majoritarian parties a resource? I thought you said they were something
to be removed post haste. Thinking this neglects to consider their changed
role in a political ecology of parliamentarian elections in two senses.
First, a political ecological change can reverse the traditional role of
these gatekeepers to power, turning them into informal coalition builders.
As such they will become just one of the many paths to nation-state power,
making for a more democratic procedural process, which I defined earlier as
minimizing first-order power relationships of monopoly control on methods
to power. Let us say that there were more players on the field of
nation-state politics which could win power. Following the literature into
the interaction with state structures and political parties in Europe and
the United States [especially Kerisi et al.], what happens is that the
majoritarian parties moderate themselves politically to gather more
supporter in situation where they are 'out' of power. This is one of the
side effects of widening the political structural choice. It makes the
large parties over into a coalition form, otherwise large parties don't
stay in the running at all. Change their overall ecology and they will

Secondly, they will be a strategic 'presence' in the political ecology, by
both sopping up coalitional building into their structure to survive,
majoritarian parties can simultaneously split the danger of an ideological
upheaval in the nation-state (i.e., fascist, or revolution, etc.) Whereas
before they contributed to the frustration and the endangerment of
democratic procedure, in a different political ecology then can contribute
to a maintenance of the plurality of political means of democratic
procedure, by splitting any large ideological pressure. They become a force
of political ecological deflection of ideological interests. The danger I
see is that a 'fascist' type of power with grass roots ideological support
with develop potentially if the government becomes a fragmented plurality
on the nation-state level either politically or economically, leaving an
opening for such a group to move into power, or for the increase of TNC
pressure on the nation-state level. This is why I suggest that only one
area of the nation-state government, the House of Representatives perhaps,
should be parliamenarianized. This will preserve the recourse to having a
systemic influence of a dueling majoritarian political parties on one level
of the nation-state government which leads to systemic centralization in
the nation-state level to some degree, which is positive. It is only
negative when majoritarian parties dominate the only democratic procedural
path, as they have for both Houses of Congress throughout the history of
the United States. This partially provides for a "Hamiltonian" sense of the
importance of assuring that national economic interests and the
nation-state political interests elide for nation-state stability, yet only
partially: far from the full extent which was institutionalized at the time
of the Continental Congress in the 1780's. This role in the novel political
ecology I would posit provides more structural security for the
nation-state through open elections than it ever could buy with repression.
Further elaborating this point, majoritarian parties, when they
simultaneously providing for informal coalition building and splitting
ideological endangerment of the nation-state and parliamentarianism,
majoritarian parties provide for increasing the plurality of methods of
achieving power and preserving these democratic procedural methods, both
marks of actual democracy. Competing majoritarian parties may even
ironically contribute to disrupting TNC backed attempts to dominate the
discourse of the nation-state, in a different political ecology.

Thirdly, majoritarian parties will continue to have one unchanged role,
that of orienting nation-state identity of the national culture at large.
In a functional sense, what they can do for the varied population of the
nation state is to provide a sense of identification larger than their
circumscribed interests. This stabilization of identity for a huge
multicultural state is in addition to their other two changed roles
mentioned above.

One has to make a differentiation between state interests and democratic
interests. A democratic state is perhaps the trickiest balance, especially
one which allows for a plurality of democratic procedure. In my eyes is the
only state capable of being called a democracy, because any other would
depend upon first-degree power relationships to maintain it instead of
democratic procedure. One always has consider one's desires for a stable
state (which would likely be undermined by full democratic
plurality--aspects outside the scope of this essay) with one's desires for

One may ask what about labor groups and other methods of organization? Are
they included? Thinking in these terms seems to posit that there is a
separation of interests here between labor interests and localized
interests, which is false. There's nothing stopping these groups from using
these ideas/structures or participating. Actually, they would have a head
start already being nation-state wide organizational forms, for utilizing
these localized networking principles and strategies which develop out of
them. That's the whole point: to aid integration on communal interests, and
network to levels of politics on wider dimensions of power.

(3) "Affirmative Cooperatives:"
Using Mutualized Economies of Scale for Developing a Separate Third World
Financial Sector There are always elites of some sort. What is important to
realize their activities can be influenced by changing the political
ecology of interaction of systemic and non-systemic interests, either
though organizational structural change or the increase or decrease of
choice for a service. Cooperative structures which by definition are
organized around mutualized economies of scale of production and
consumption (instead of privately organized economies of scale of
production only) provide a useful comparison on how leadership 'styles' are
affected by organizational structural constraints. Albert O. Hirschman's
conceptions of exit and voice describe quite simply the strategic options
available in different political ecologies. [Hirschman, 1970] There are
situations where 'exit' is preferred, when there are many options for the
same service. There are situations where 'voice' of political complaint or
challenge is the preferred option. These situations of voice are more
likely to occur when there is a lack of individual choice for a service. So
there is a great potential for political feedback as well as a call for
creating mutualized economies of scale which cooperatize elements of
production or process of services or goods. In the Third World's case, a
highly beneficial mutualized economy of scale exists for redistribution of
economic wealth to these marginalized areas of the world's political and
economical circuits. Thus, they should effectively look into developing
their own political and economic circuits.

One would think that the World Bank as the world's most strategically
central lender with around 77 billion in callable assets (1987 figures) and
a profit every year since it's founding in 1948 would be making its
member's wealthy. Yes, and no. For the largest holders of the capital, the
returns are very great. Yet for many nation-states involved in the Bank
(like Chad with .01% of the capital, or Bangladesh with .33% of the
capital), many of these nation-states are experiencing the rigors of
'structural adjustment,' which means orienting their economies to repay
their loans at the expense of their social services to their populations.
Unlike the egalitarian principle of the United Nations "one nation, one
vote" principle, the World Bank's internal politics is determined by the
relative size of the capital allotment to the Bank from each nation-state.
The three largest holders of bank capital (1987 figures, in both the
International Development Association (IDA) and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) were the United States, West Germany,
and Japan. It is the interest payments which seems to be the Banks largest
profit generator. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
figures for 1987 showed that the bank had taken "$1.1 billion more in
repayments of interest and principal on old loans that it paid out in new
loans to the developing countries." [Hancock, 1989] Thus in this privatized
economy of scale, organized and orchestrated by a few incredibly wealthy
nation-states, the greater number of nation-states are getting a poor
return in the organization as well as experiencing a maintaenance and
increasing impoverishment of their marginalized position.

To gain control of their own capital market in a TNC dominated and
globalzing era, as well as to develop some sense of political and economic
sovereignty over their internal development, I suggest that there is a huge
mutualized economy of scale waiting to be tapped amongst the massively
impoverished nation-states which have only a fraction of a percent invested
in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

A cooperative structure could pool together these smaller countries both
politically as well as economically, and they could profit from their own
capital lending to themselves, as well as determine to a greater extent
their own developmental programs. Yet an 'affirmative' structure of lending
which allowed mixed membership may be more successful in this case [Meyer,
1989], where they would likely still want to participate in the privatized
World Bank structure simultaneously. It is found that the most stable form
in many co-operative forms is a partial elision between individual
self-interest and a mutualized economy of scale which has been
institutionalized in one function of the cooperative structure. [Meyer,
1989; Tendler et al., 1988] Credit is generally maintained in a
co-operative structure only when it is beneficial to a production method
which is unable to be performed without it, or elites require money to
market the co-operative goods. So I am either suggesting the first choice,
determining some aspect of food production which they could economies and
thereby reduce their experience of externalized costs of production, or
make a marketing oriented co-op for local products on the world market. For
the record, I should suggest the long shot of changing the overall
structure of the World Bank to have a co-operative distributive function of
the profits (perhaps by United Nations law), though this is highly unlikely
to be achieved because of the systemic power of the nation-states which are
profiting from the privatized banking structure as well as the budgetary
separation of the United Nations and the World Bank which are not fiscally
related or answerable to the United Nations, and thus, the United Nations
is unable to influence the Bank organizationally in this regard. The World
Bank is simply a private organization.

More research should be done on what mutualized economies of scale could be
developed for Third World nation-states, which would facilitate a separate
world capital market which may serve a redistributive function in addition
to the lending functional in the name of finance. This would simultaneously
provide a buffer against TNC economic dislocation as well as reduce TNC

Conclusion: DeGlobalization:
            Notes for a Philosophy of Development, and Nation-State
            Democratic Security
This essay has touched on two flanking strategies for countering the
erosion of both the nation-state from the inside by TNC political
domination, as well as from the outside, by strategies of developing
capital markets which are increasingly separated from privatized TNC forms.
This is both a long term and a short term strategy. It has offered a means
for a democratic philosophy of a plurality of structural forms of power
simultaneously as the best means to avoid what I have called systemic
drift, defined as a process which abets increasing inequity, clientelism,
and organizational embeddedness in society. I would add that a tacit point
which has been running in the background of this argument, is that this
systemic drift in addition abets ecological degradation. Thus, this becomes
a political philosophy theory, a developmental philosophy, and a recipie
for sustainable development.

I have argued that political structures can be a strategic means to embed
economics to the localized level which has yet to be considered in the
literature on development. I have posed historical sociological analysis of
a systemic drift which is related to the two above points of local
political marginalization combined with increasing TNC presence in the
world though the nation-state government abetment of this process.

I am interested in using sited systemic power relations as a long term way
to plan for sustainable development. As political pathways embed certain
economic relationships, I argue that the "developmental philosopher's
stone" of sustainable development is based on sustainable forms of politics
which avoid the systemic drift phenomeon.

So the 'big question' becomes: how to both diffuse people's interest in a
world government, which will only solidify the TNC power they opposed in
the first place, as well as generate interest in the nation-state political
venue as the form of government most adaptable to develop a sustainable
political conception, and thus, sustainable economic development?

I have posed several invigorating strategies, using the United States as
the example. If the Untied States can be brought within a more equitable
political sphere, it will have large effect on the politics of the
'globalizing' economy, since this globalizing economy is greatly
underwritten by military might and laws of the United States.

Yet in a sense, as I mentioned earlier these were abstract examples in
political theory as much as political analysis, on how these were
'sustainable political' principles which could be utilized in any
nation-state. It is only crippled political structures worldwide allow the
systemic interest of TNC's to dismantle the nation-state economies in
preference for their own TNC penetration and dominance of the economy and
of political structures. One has to build slowly for long term
sustainability. There is alot of practical experience involved in
developing localized political elites which are systemically linked to
local interests, and there is much change economically to be pressured from
that political change between systemic actors. Yet change the systemic
actors so that externalized costs are fed back into the system of politics,
and out of their conflicts they will find solutions.

A sustainable politics is perhaps the best defense and plan for ecological
degradation, instead of 'managerial' techniques which fail to integrate in
highly multiplex relationships people and the environmental level. I would
add as an aside that a rural political processes in themselves can be used
as an environmental feedback into urban politics. If rural areas have a
more secure financial sphere organizations which depend upon, they will
have their own agenda. This depends upon further research into which crops
contribute through technological productions of economies of scale in
processing or harvesting, with economies of scale and well-chosen crop
production to be strategic mechanisms for webbing people to embed mtuliplex
organizations, so they will be more likely to oppose a degradative force
which disrupts them.

As the Progressives noted in their critiques of the inheritance of the
state power ideologies inherited from the European eighteenth century
thinkers, there was little place for the United States (and the world's for
that matter) urban sites in such theories of power in a nation-state. This
essay is a contribution on how to structurally move to adapt local urban
input systemically into the nation-state political structure, and how to
'philosophically' understand its value in politics and the creation of
'sustainable politics' that avoids clientelistic and unrepresentative
informal relationships. Strategically, this is done though developing what
urban sites (meaning urban impoversihed interests) generally lack that
makes them succeptible 'prey' to clientelistic representation--they lack
multiplex relationships which can serve as a resource for reducing the
costs of political mobilization in an urban as well as a nation-state
context for themselves.

This essay posits a work of theory in how to systemically integrate and
conceptualize urbanization and political parties into fully 'functional'
actors in a theory of state, and what types of state laws effect an
equitable balance of power. The balance of power should theoretically take
more than the governments organization into account, as it traditionally
does. It should take into account

(1)political ecological effects of the government structure on society,
(2)the state's and political parties' effects on cultural centralization,
(3) the role of informal parties as long term actors in competion
relationships, (4) as well as urbanization (through the CDI) as endemically
a means to provide a workable relationship between local political
pressure, national political pressure, and state authority, which
preferences the coalition of power between them instead of as historically
has been the case in the United States, only the national political
pressure and the state elision.

It's a way of realizing that 'factionalism' as it is called by the early
founders of the United States is innately a part of any working
nation-state democracy, and should be taken into account functionally as a
process in how to integrate and balance this factionalism in a functional
theoretical sense to maintain a plurality of democratic procedures.
Democracy is nothing more than having equal recourse to a plurality of
means or strategies to speak to power. This will ensure a removal of
first-degree power relationships from the methods of achieving nation-state
power which contribute to systemic drift described above.

These strategies will ensure that the impoverished have a political
recourse of their own besides falling back on pressuring the process of
systemic drift which only leads in the long term to increasing unsustainble
development practices and increasing inequity in political and economic
relationships. With the CDI and Hanse Nationalism, a means is developed to
guide this political voice into systemic action of its own on the
nation-state level instead of relying on clientelism of intervening parties.

In terms of TNC and nation-state led globalization, we have to work on
cutting all hydra's heads at once, at both the nation-state level that
TNC's rely upon to rubberstamp economic globalization, and addtionally in
the international financial sector.

We should be thinking of strategies of facilitating this process of this
simultaneous systemic opposition which both primes and institutionalizes a
local political force in a manner which is sustainable, as well a
facilitating the Third World nations to develop a capital market for their
countries. I'm serious about this second one, as much as their first.

It is important to remember that these are not direct political policy
proposals merely for the United States. These are political process
proposals to assure that the mechanisms are more representative by
integrating different network of power instead of increasing only just one
method of power in a political procedural system. Thus, they avoid getting
the process tailored by the most powerful interest in a society, which I
would argue is what happens and what does happen in the systemic drift

Without a means to 'peg' and institutionalize local coalitional building as
a resource to be utilized for national level politics, the systemic drift
occurs, and with it the systemic inequalities of culture, politics, and
economics will occur, leading to ecological degradation. The Hanse
Hationalism theory of an equitable democratic state, with its CDI
conception, are designed to maintain a local systemic power in urban areas,
facilitating a path for a local, non-clientenistic grass roots politics.
Therefore, structurally, a systemic drift can be held in abeyance and a
democratic politics can be maintained. We lack a state theory of democratic
politics that deals with urban sites. I offer that this is one, and is an
ethical basis for the 21st century to seriously consider as a model of
politics, unless they would enjoy a re-run of the 20th century massive
inequities justified off of democratic poltics, further marring it as a
political ideal.


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