-------------------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2003 09:35:21 -0800 To: •••@••.••• From: "Fred V. Cook" <•••@••.•••> Subject: Re: Joe Vialls: An amazing geopolitical assessment! Dear Richard, This is a very important (if true) piece of information which (to date) has not gotten the attention it deserves in the US commercial media. I would like to verify the facts behind it. How much verification do YOU know of to date? Have "mainstream" or even "alternative media known for good fact-checking" published the basics of this story yet? Thanks, Fred ---- Dear Fred, I searched the web for "Sunburn" and found a number of things. The Sunburn missile seems to be real enough, with the capabilities Viall claims. Russia did sell the missile to China, causing concern in Congress, and it has been deployed on ships and planes. I didn't find another report claiming deployment in Syria or Iraq. I found a Washington Post article mentioning the Sunburn and describing the heightening tensions between Washington and Bejing. I'd say the credibility rating of Viall's material stands rather high at this point. I'll paste in some of the material I found below with URLs. rkm -------------------------------------------------------- http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/moskit.htm Moskit SS-N-22 Sunburn The NATO designation SS-N-22 'Sunburn' is believed to be designated P270 Moskit, the air-breathing variant of the naval missile 3M80 (the designation 3M80 apparently referring to the Mach 3 speed of 1980 weapons). It may have been designed originally to enhance the effectiveness of Missile Cutter Brigades (that is, units of missile-equipped FACs) and Destroyer Brigades hitherto dependent upon the Malachit or SS-N-9 'Siren'. It is used on "Sovremennyy" destroyers (eight missiles on each) and on "Tarantul [Tarantula] III patrol ships (four missiles on each). A high supersonic speed was specified to reduce the target's time to deploy self-defense weapons, indeed the weapon was designed specifically to strike ships with the Aegis command and weapon control system and the SM-2 surface-to-air missile. The Moskit (3M80) is a ramjet-powered missile with a slim forward body and ovoid nose, and a fatter rear half with four divided air intakes. There are four clipped delta platform wings and four smaller tail surfaces of similar shape organized in cruciform configuration around the fuselage. All the wings and tail surfaces are folded when the missile is in the launcher. Internally the radar seeker is in the nose with the guidance system, batteries and radio altimeter in the remainder of the front compartment, and the 300 kg semi-armor-piercing warhead immediately behind. A fuel tank, presumably with a kerosene-type fuel, occupies the area to the leading edges of the wing and the area almost to the rear edges is occupied by the ramjet. Much of the rear of the missile is occupied by a solid propellant booster through which runs the ramjet nozzle. Actuators are to be found below the tail surfaces. The 3M82 "Mosquito" missiles have the fastest flying speed among all antiship missiles in today's world. It reaches Mach 3 at a high altitude and its maximum low-altitude speed is M2.2, triple the speed of the American Harpoon. The missile takes only 2 minutes to cover its full range and manufacturers state that 1-2 missiles could incapacitate a destroyer while 1-5 missiles could sink a 20000 ton merchantman. An extended range missile, 9M80E is now available. When slower missiles, like the French Exocet are used, the maximum theoretical response time for the defending ship is 150-120 seconds. This provides time to launch countermeasures and employ jamming before deploying "hard" defense tactics such as launching missiles and using quick-firing artillery. But the 3M82 "Mosquito" missiles are extremely fast and give the defending side a maximum theoretical response time of merely 25-30 seconds, rendering it extremely difficult employ jamming and countermeasures, let alone fire missiles and quick-firing artillery. The air-launched version, officially called ASM-MMS and apparently also Kh-4, is intended specially for Su-27K (Su-33) carrier-based fighter aircraft. It was for the first time shown to the CIS leaders in February 1992 in Machulishche and then to the public in August 1992 at the Moscow Air Show in Zhukovskiy. The missile is propelled by a dual (rocket-jet) engine operating by the same principle as the Kh-31 engine. The missile, suspended under the aircraft, has a folding wing. The missile is guided by an autopilot during the initial fight stage, with possible correction by the aircraft pilot, and by active radar during the final flight stage. Specifications Contractor Raduga Entered Service Total length 9.745 m Diameter Wingspan 2.10 m Weight 4500 kg Warhead Weight 320 kg Propulsion Maximum Speed Mach 2 [some claim Mach 3] Maximum effective range 48 nm (90 km) 65 nm (120 km) in 3M80E some sources claim 250 km Flight Altitude 20 meters above sea level Guidance mode active radar Single-shot hit probability References * "Survey of Russian Guided Air-to-Ground and Anti-Ship Missiles" by Piotr Butowski, NOWA TEKHNIKA WOJSKOWA March 1995 No 3, pp 15-19 [JPRS-UMA-95-023: 7 June 1995] Maintained by John Pike Last Modified: July 15, 2002 - 13:36 Copyright © 2000-2003 GlobalSecurity.org All Rights Reserved -------------------------------------------------------- http://www.fas.org/news/taiwan/2000/e-03-28-00-11.htm CONGRESSMEN SEEK RESOLUTION TO HALT RUSSIAN MISSILE SALES TO CHINA Washington, March 27 (CNA) Sixteen US congressmen have co-sponsored a House resolution seeking to prevent Russia from further providing Communist China with Sunburn anti-ship missiles that they say endanger America's national security. "The purpose of this Act is to prohibit the forgiveness or rescheduling of any bilateral debt owed by the Russian Federation to the US until it has terminated all sales and transfers of Moskit (Sunburn) anti-ship missiles," said Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-Calif), chairman of the House International Relations Asia-Pacific Subcommittee, when introducing the resolution on March 16. The resolution noted that within weeks after the arrival in February of the first of the two Russian-built Sovremenny-class destroyers sold to Beijing, the Russians are scheduled to transfer the first of several of the ship's most lethal weapon, the radar-guided Sunburn anti-ship missiles, which can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads. The supersonic Sunburn missile, which can be mounted on a naval or mobile land platform, was designed specifically to destroy American aircraft carriers and other warships equipped with advanced Aegis radar and combat management systems. The US Navy considers the missile to be extremely difficult to defend against, adds the resolution. It continues that the Sunburn missile has an over-the-horizon range of 65 miles and can deliver a 200-kiloton warhead in under two minutes. One conventional Sunburn missile can sink a warship or disable an aircraft carrier, causing the deaths of hundreds of American military personnel. Russia is also helping the air force of the People's Liberation Army to assemble Sukhoi SU-27 fighter aircraft, which are capable of carrying an air-launched version of the Sunburn missile, which has an even longer range than the sea-launched one. Russia is reportedly discussing the sale of these air-launched Sunburn missiles to China, notes the resolution. It points out that land, sea, or air-launched Sunburn missiles raise the potential for American casualties and could affect the outcome in any future conflict in the Taiwan Straits or South China Sea. Moreover, the transfer of the missile by Beijing to Iran or other belligerent nations in the Persian Gulf region would increase the potential for conflict and for American casualties. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the resolution says, the president shall not reschedule or forgive any outstanding debt owed to the United States by Russia until the president certifies to Congress that Russia has permanently terminated all transfers of Sunburn anti-ship missiles, particularly transfers to mainland China. The resolution requires the president to submit within 30 days after the resolution's enactment and every six months thereafter to both houses of Congress a report identifying the status of any contract and the date of the transfer of any version of the Sunburn missile, particularly transfers to China on or after Feb. 1, 2000. (By Nelson Chung) -------------------------------------------------------- http://www.google.ie/search?q=cache:_b7MpclnMj4J:www.csis.org/isp/pubs/a_010408_campbell.pdf+sunburn+missile&hl=en&ie=UTF-8 Old Game, New Risks The Washington Post April 08, 2001 By Kurt M. Campbell A U.S. reconnaissance plane monitoring another nation's air defense radars and ground communications is intercepted aggressively by armed fighter jets. Once on the ground, the spy plane is stormed by the other nation's troops and searched while the crew is sequestered and questioned. Accusations fly; positions harden; tensions mount. The episode conjures up images of Cold War-era standoffs, like Gary Powers's fateful U-2 flight over the Soviet Union, the USS Pueblo incident with North Korea, and the capture of the merchant ship Mayaguez during the Vietnam War. Except the Cold War is 10 years dead and the other nation involved is China. And while the United States and China are not exactly friends, they are far from enemies. In recent years the two governments have been working together on a range of significant initiatives, from seeking Chinese entry into the World Trade Organization to trying to prevent conflict on the Korean peninsula. So we are acting out a familiar scenario -- but without the familiar safeguards of the Cold War years. The long, almost ritualistic competition between the Soviet and U.S. armed forces was kept in check by a host of mechanisms that came into play when military maneuvering threatened to trigger a crisis. Berlin's Four-Power Air Control Center was jointly manned to avoid mishaps in the crowded skies over divided Berlin; the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement helped defuse tension when Soviet and U.S. warships, staking out rival versions of Soviet territorial waters, actually bumped; the Dangerous Military Incidents Agreement of 1988 was designed to forestall problems exactly like the standoff over the American EP-3 spy plane. Over time, these military meetings helped successive governments in Washington and Moscow build a modicum of trust and develop unwritten "rules of the road." The United States and China don't have such safety valves, at least not yet. The only comparable arrangement we have managed to agree upon is the 1998 Military Maritime Agreement, but its mandate is vague and it has yet to be applied in any meaningful way. Late in the week, the Bush administration was looking at the possibility of using the pact, though exactly how was not clear. So far, China appears reluctant to establish any real confidence-building measures with Washington, particularly in the security realm. The truth is, China simply wants to halt U.S. military activities near its territory -- not create a mechanism that by implication acknowledges the legitimacy of such forays. What Chinese leaders fear most is that true engagement with the United States would reveal their many weaknesses. They recognize that their military capabilities are still far inferior to those of the United States. The U.S.-Soviet competition was global, involving activity in air, sea and space. By comparison, the Chinese military is largely a land force. Only in the past decade has China even been able to project air power beyond its territorial waters. And that leads to another Chinese concern: This limited range means that the areas where U.S. and Chinese forces would most likely interact and possibly confront each other are very close to China's national territory, not America's. The Chinese don't send spy planes up and down our coasts. Imagine if they did: Imagine a Chinese reconnaissance plane cruising off the Atlantic seaboard, purposely setting off defense warning systems and monitoring the response. Imagine it colliding with an F-15 fighter that scrambled to intercept it, killing the American pilot. Imagine the damaged Chinese aircraft landing on Martha's Vineyard, startling natives and tourists alike. Would the United States let that plane fly right back to Beijing, nosy electronics intact? Or would we take it apart, inspect it and send it back to its owner in boxes -- as U.S. and Japanese officials did after the pilot of a Soviet MiG-25 defected in 1976? And what would the United States do about the crew? Actually, I'm certain our government would respect their rights and send them home -- in another plane. In any case, Americans would be furious and mistrustful. At the moment, the Chinese don't have the capabilities to stage that kind of reconnaissance mission. That doesn't mean, however, that their military isn't increasingly focused on the United States. Quite the contrary. In the past 50 years, China has had military skirmishes or outright wars with virtually all of its neighbors. These were land wars, which took advantage of the chief strength of the People's Liberation Army -- its massive size. But since the beginning of the 1990s, China's obsessive focus has been reunification with Taiwan, and U.S. military support for what China views as a "renegade province" is seen as the prime obstacle. So China has begun fielding more sophisticated naval and air assets, updating its technology, and deploying advanced fighter aircraft, theater missiles, submarines and warships. This process of military modernization has been uneven at best, but demonstrates the sheer determination of China's will. In particular, beginning with the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis -- when China sought to intimidate the Taiwanese by staging large military exercises and firing missiles across the narrow body of water that divides them -- the Chinese army has increased its focus on Taiwan and, by association, its U.S. backers. The best and brightest officers at the Command and Staff College outside Beijing take classes in the weak spots in the vast American military (I've seen the course syllabus), and write about it in increasingly blunt language in their military journals. Last fall, Russia sold the Chinese its fast-flying, sea- skimming Sunburn missile -- a Soviet-era weapon specifically designed to threaten U.S. aircraft carriers. Last month Beijing took the unusually belligerent step of announcing an 18-percent increase in military spending, saying it was required by a sudden rise in "dark forces" (read: the USA). Meanwhile, the United States -- even as it has worked to draw China into the international economic community -- has been strengthening its own military position in the Pacific. The fall of the Soviet Union freed Pentagon planners to pay more attention to tensions on the Korean peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait. The United States has stepped up reconnaissance flights along China's coast, revitalized security ties with allies such as Japan and halted a downward slide in regional U.S. troop strength, fixing the number of forward deployed forces at 100,000. These trends intensified on both sides throughout the five years I spent in the Pentagon. Simultaneously, of course, the other track of U.S.-Chinese engagement -- permanent "most favored nation" trading status for China, its attempt to join the WTO -- has continued. Both sides have an obvious stake in maintaining this balance between working for commercial engagement in the present, while preparing for less hopeful scenarios should the grand experiment fail. But maintaining that balance is getting trickier by the day. It is too early in the crisis (some may say it's too early to even call it a crisis) to evaluate how well President Bush's team will handle it; and it is too early in his administration to know how well he will manage the extraordinarily challenging Washington-Beijing relationship. Conflict is not inevitable. There were years, remember, when most people -- including the third-grade teachers who made a generation of kids duck and cover under their desks -- thought the Americans and Soviets would come to nuclear war. An increasingly militarized U.S.-China relationship does not have to mean war, either. Most likely, our two nations will maintain a fuzzy status between friend and foe. Ongoing trade negotiations and cooperation in regional hot spots suggest that we are willing to improve our friendly relations. The lesson we have to learn from the events on Hainan Island is how to manage and control the ways in which we remain at odds. Article reprinted with permission of The Washington Post, 2001. -- ============================================================ "...the Patriot Act followed 9-11 as smoothly as the suspension of the Weimar constitution followed the Reichstag fire." - Srdja Trifkovic There is not a problem with the system. The system is the problem. 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