___________________________________________________________ GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION : WHY WE NEED IT AND HOW WE CAN ACHIEVE IT (C) 2004 Richard K. Moore Part II : THE STORY OF AMERICA ________________________________________________________ Chapter 4: 1650-1945: THE RISE TO GLOBAL DOMINANCE * 1650-1776: Colonial prosperity and the movement for independence The British colonies in America were largely self-governing. There were Governors appointed by the King, but the day-to-day business of running the colonies was carried out by local representative assemblies. Under this regime the colonies prospered. Boston became the empire's third largest trading port, and the colonies competed effectively with Britain in shipbuilding, ocean transport, iron production, fishing, distilling, woolens, and much else. Indeed it was the success of the colonies that initially led to problems with the Britain. British merchants demanded that Parliament protect them from colonial competition, leading to the Woolens Act (1699), the Hat Act (1732), Molasses Act (1733), and the Iron Act (1750). These measures aimed to restrict production and trade by the colonies, and they were to a large extent ignored by the colonists. More serious conflict developed when the Crown attempted to impose taxes to recoup Britain for its protection of the colonies in the French and Indian War (1754-63). At the end of this war Britain had a national debt of 75,000,000 Pounds, and the Sugar Act (1756) and the Stamp Act (1765) were imposed on the colonies. In addition the Crown became more insistent on enforcing the earlier trade restrictions. A movement for independence arose which was made up primarily of the more affluent elements of American society. The movement was strongest around the main trading ports. For the wealthy landowners and commercial elite in the colonies, the advantages of independence were clear. With full freedom of trade and development, and an end to Royal levies, there were immense profits to be made. Dissent and rebellion were encouraged among the populace, and British rule was becoming increasingly oppressive. But as late as 1775 most colonists were interested not in independence but in redress of their grievances as loyal British subjects. What may have turned the tide of popular opinion toward independence was the publication by Tom Paine of "Common Sense" in January 1776. It sold more copies than any previous book in history and was read out loud on street corners to attentive crowds not only in the colonies but also in Ireland and France and wherever else republican ideas had taken root. Paine managed to persuasively and plainly convey the Enlightenment notion that kings were not a God-given necessity, that people actually could rule themselves, and that they had a natural right to do so. Today we take those as obvious platitudes, but at the time this represented a paradigm shift of consciousness that even oppressive Royal troops and a Boston Massacre could not bring about by themselves. Most people had been ruled by kings and potentates, usually claiming divine authority, ever since civilization began. It was not easy to embrace the notion that a society could operate without them. A ship without a captain? Thus the population began to turn toward independence, but they did so largely in the belief that they were going to find relief from oppressive rule generally. They were empowered by the idea of popular sovereignty and they wanted real democracy. They meant to overthrow not only Royal rule, but oppression by local elites as well. Those local elites were quite pleased to see the shift in public opinion toward independence. They fanned the flames with democratic oratory and they assumed leadership of the growing movement. With this mass constituency they could think seriously of ousting the Crown from American shores. In September 1776, only nine months after the publication of Common Sense, the Declaration of Independence was drafted and signed by members of the elite leadership. This document espoused radical democratic ideals, and declared the right of "the people" to replace their government at any time they deem it necessary. * 1776-1789: The Revolution betrayed The revolutionary struggle went on for eight years at great sacrifice by the population and the soldiers. In the immediate aftermath of the war the sense of democratic empowerment was running high. Many from among the local conservative elite went back to Britain or migrated to Canada. Thirteen sovereign States were formed, under the Articles of Confederation. Many of the legislatures were controlled by radical agrarians; the connection between government and people was relatively strong. The grand experiment in democracy and popular sovereignty seemed to be off to a good start. But there were problems. So much was new that unforeseen difficulties arose. There was no common agreement to protect sea lanes, for example, and piracy became rife. The States all agreed that the Articles required amendment. A more collaborative framework was needed. The legislatures agreed to sponsor a Constitutional Convention, empowered to amend the Articles and bring them back for unanimous approval of the States. The delegates were supposed to represent their States, and the Constitution was to be an agreement among the States, an amended version of the Articles. Such was the charter under which the Convention was empowered to operate. The legislatures, unfortunately, mostly appointed their delegates from among their local wealthy elites. The delegates then ensconced themselves in secret session and proceeded to betray the charter under which they had been assembled. They discarded the Articles, and began debating and drafting a wholly new document, one that transferred sovereignty to a relatively strong central government. The delegates reneged on the States that had sent them, and took it upon themselves to speak directly for "We The People"--and thus begins the preamble to their Constitution. In effect they accomplished a coup d'etat. They managed to design a system that would enable existing elites to continue to run the affairs of the new nation, as they had before under the Crown--under a Constitution that for all the world seems to embody sound democratic principles. At every level of the new Constitution there were safeguards against uprisings from below. The life-appointed Supreme Court Justices and the six-year Senators provided a kind of conservative flywheel against any kind of rapid change. The President was to be elected indirectly by State Legislatures, which provided a buffer from "mob" sentiments in each state. Most significantly, the strongest protections in the Constitution were granted to private property. The Constitutional sanctity of private property guaranteed that existing elites would be able to hold on to and continue developing their fortunes. Whereas in most European nations the financial system is controlled by a central government bank, in the new American republic the private sector was given a more influential role. This provides American elites with a way to influence economic affairs outside of political channels. This may seem like a cynical assessment of the legacy of America's "Founding Fathers". Have they not given us all those noble sayings?... "Give me liberty or give me death.", "The price of liberty is eternal vigilance.", .etc. Were they not true democrats? Some were and some weren't. Even the best of them, like Thomas Jefferson, was a slave owner. The worst of them, like Alexander Hamilton, would have preferred rule by an American royalty. In general the allegiance of colonial elites to democracy was tempered by their concern for their own self-interest, and their notion of how society should operate. They didn't want Royal interference in their affairs, but neither did they want interference by what many of them referred to as "mob rule". By the very way they carried out the secret Constitutional Convention they demonstrated how the new government was going to operate. They were delegates, chartered to represent their constituencies, and they were mostly from wealthy elite circles. When gathered in their own company they represented instead their own mutual interests--yet they presented their work as the embodiment of their charter. And they succeeded politically in selling their product to the people and to the States. Such has been the story of American politics ever since. * 1790-1918: The rise of a great imperial power One way to characterize the structure of the new United States is to note that it was set up from the outset as an efficiently run empire. Each state, particularly in the early days, ran its own affairs--just as they had under the Crown. But ultimate sovereignty, especially as regards foreign affairs, the currency, the military, and war and peace, was wrested firmly in Washington--as before it was wrested with the Crown. From this perspective the Federal Government simply replaced the role of the Crown in the administration of what had been the American portion of the British Empire. I suggest that this characterization of the U.S. system as an empire-from-the-beginning is a useful one. From this perspective one can see a continuous thread in the dynamics of U.S. development, connecting what are often seen as distinct phases of U.S. history--early nation building and later imperial expansion. What we've had from the beginning, from this perspective, is an empire controlled by an elite establishment whose operations are centered along the northeastern seaboard. There lie the crossroads of commerce and the halls of government; there is and always has been the nerve center of the American Empire. There has always been a well-trodden path between Boston, New York, and Washington D.C. From a base of thirteen original States, the empire expanded, primarily by means of displacing the native population and adding more States to the empire. The empire expanded by other means as well. America purchased the French territories from Napoleon (1803) and picked up Texas and the southwestern States by provoking a war with Mexico (1846). Those most able to invest in the development of the new imperial realms were those who already had the most money--the wealthy Yankee elite who were already running the rest of the empire. Thus as the empire expanded, control continued to remain concentrated largely in the same elite community, based primarily but not exclusively along the northeast coast. An internal conflict in the empire developed as the interests of the plantation-based South come increasingly into conflict with the interests of the industry-based North. The plantation system was basically a feudal economy, and it offered relatively few investment opportunities for the Eastern Establishment. The South was, relatively speaking, outside the capitalist economy which dominated the rest of the empire. While the North wanted protectionism to shelter its budding industries, the South wanted free trade to maximize its cotton exports. The Yankees put the South under increasing pressure as it maneuvered Federal policies towards its own interests at the expense of the South. Ultimately the Southern States banded together (1861) and asserted their right to secede from the Union and pursue their own destiny as a separate nation. One might have thought, based on the principles expressed in the Declaration of Independence, that the South had the right to secede. The citizens of the South generally supported secession, and they had expressed that through their chosen representatives. Was not the new American nation founded on the principle that people had the right to change their government when they found it to be oppressive? Was not the South merely expressing that right? That's not how the Yankee elite looked at the situation--and with the Southern representatives absent from Congress, control of the Federal Government passed fully into Northern hands. The declaration of secession provided the Yankees with an opportunity to do away with the plantation system once and for all, and bring the South more fully into the capitalist economy. The South would then be open for investment and development, and the empire could focus its trade and tariff policies on the needs of industrial development. The cession was officially rejected by Washington and the ensuing brutal Civil War left the South gratuitously devastated. Yankee investors and corporations rushed in to exploit the available opportunities to buy up resources and to develop and rebuild the impoverished and devastated territory - for their own economic enrichment. In this way the American Empire grew to its full continental size, with minimal conflict or involvement with the world's other imperial powers. While those continued to struggle and compete for colonial territories, the U.S. was the only shark in its pool, and an immense and rich pool it was. Historians say that the U.S. emerged as an imperial power in 1898, with the Spanish American War, but I suggest that any account of imperialism in the 1800s should feature America's westward expansion as one of the major episodes. The size and wealth of the continental empire was on a scale with the European empires of the same period, and the operation of empire enabled--as with the European powers--the development of a comparable-scale industrial base in the imperial heartland. During the the development of its continental empire, America had by no means limited its imperialist activities to the westward expansion project. By the State Department's own figures, during the period 1798 to 1895, the U.S. intervened no less than 103 times in the affairs of other countries--ranging from Africa, throughout Latin America, and beyond to Hawaii, Japan, and China. The purpose of these interventions was always to protect local U.S. business interests or else to open new markets or gain access to resources. America generally followed a high-leverage imperialist model. Selective interventions and the arrangement of friendly coups represent a low-maintenance approach to empire, compared with the administrative colonial models so popular among the European powers of the era. In 1898, with Spain in decline, the American Establishment saw an easy opportunity to expand its imperial territory by seizing Cuba and the Philippines. A suspicious explosion on the Battleship Maine provided the excuse for hostilities, and the territories were readily captured by U.S. forces. In the same year Hawaii was forced to yield sovereignty to Washington. By 1918 America's empire stretched across the Pacific, included a broad swath of the North American continent, and included in its sphere of influence most of Latin America. America traded world wide, had a world-class navy and merchant fleet, possessed immense wealth and natural resources, and its industrial capacity was second to none. Although perceived by Europeans as a new entrant--an upstart perhaps--in the imperialist game, America was in fact by 1918 a mature and efficiently run world-class imperial power. The only new development was the fact that the growth of the American Empire had in 1898 for the first time since the War of 1812 involved direct military confrontation with a European competitor. * The growth pattern of Tyrannosaurus Capitalis Americanis Let's review developments so far from the perspective of America's wealthy elite establishment. Under the Crown, these elites had accumulated wealth and property and had established businesses, trading firms, and banks. The same elites dominated political affairs in the colonies, and were the first to see the economic benefits that could be derived from Independence. Even in colonial days, these elites were heavily involved in the business of empire. Not only were they managing the North American affairs of the British Empire on behalf of the Crown, but they were also competing on their own--and quite effectively--in international trade and commerce. If they could achieve independence, they would not simply be in control of a collection of liberated colonies--they would collectively become an independent imperial and trading competitor on the world scene. A century later the cultural heirs of that same elite establishment had become the managers and owners of a world-class empire. And though the membership and structure of that establishment had shifted over time, we can trace always a certain strategic continuity, and a regular cyclical pattern of development. Each cycle begins --every thirty-odd years--with the acquisition by warfare of a significant new imperial territory, and then continues with the digestion (economic consolidation) of that new territory into the imperial system. This pattern of territorial expansion is synchronized with the economic cycles of the capitalist economic system. When a new territory is acquired, it provides a new realm for investment and growth. Loans and investment capital are made available, development projects are undertaken, new markets are opened, and new industrial infrastructure is established. Thus each cycle begins with a boom phase, characterized by rapid economic growth, entrepreneurial activity, the emergence of new fortunes, and the integration of new players into elite circles. During these boom times employment levels are typically high, and the population generally experiences a period of relative prosperity. These boom cycles follow in the aftermath of a war, as occurred after the Mexican War, the Civil War, and the Spanish American War--those wars being the means by which new capital expansion realms were acquired. After a while, the boom phase always begins to slow down. The growth curves of entrepreneurial ventures begin to level out, the new markets gradually become saturated, and the big investors begin to shift their attention from expansion to consolidation. Although the growth of the overall imperial economy--the economic pie--stagnates, wealthy elites manage to continue growing their own investments by grabbing bigger slices of the remaining pie for themselves. Their wealth and economic power is always concentrated in the biggest corporations and enterprises, and during this consolidation phase those corporations begin to pursue a strategy of mergers, acquisitions, and monopolization of production and markets. Smaller operators are driven out of business or acquired, and the ownership of production facilities and distribution channels concentrates in a handful of ultra-large corporations. A classic example of this phase was known as the Robber Baron era, which occurred between the Civil and Spanish American Wars. During the boom phase, new wealth is created and is distributed comparatively widely in society. During the consolidation phase little new overall wealth is created, and the strategy of consolidation enables wealthy elites to continue increasing their own wealth by increasing the fraction of commerce and productive property that they own and control. While the society generally experiences a boom and bust phase, wealthy elites experience capital growth during both phases, by using two different investment strategies. The economy functions like a two-phase money pump: the piston may go up or down, but in either case wealth is driven into elite coffers. Eventually, the consolidation phase begins to burn itself out in its turn--and wealthy elites finally begin to feel the squeeze that society generally has been suffering under for some time. Thus a full cycle comes to its end, and only a new growth cycle can keep the American economy going. A new growth cycle requires new investment realms, and elite political leaders soon develop a justification to pursue another round of imperial expansion. The new war itself provides the economy with a jump-start, and the new territory enables the next growth cycle to play out its course. Each cycle begins with a new predation, and is followed by two digestion phases. The first digestion phase incorporates the new territory and resources into the capitalist machine, while the second phase concentrates the resulting wealth and property into the imperial beast's dominant organs--its elite rulers. Only when the elite themselves feel hunger does the beast rouse itself for another kill. During the period 1789 to 1898, major predations were completed at the end of the Revolutionary War, the Mexican War, the Civil War, and the Spanish America War. That's three complete cycles from 1789 to 1898--an average of thirty six years per cycle. Compared to the challenges faced by the competing European powers, America's imperial growth during this period was mostly a case of easy pickings. The Native Americans were never any serious obstacle to westward expansion, the conquest of Mexico was more a training ground for Civil War generals that it was a war, and the Spanish colonies weren't attacked until after Spain was in too weak a condition to mount an effective defense. The Civil War was the only war in which American citizens experienced the scale of devastation and casualties that routinely characterizes Europe's inter-sibling warfare. While European powers had to compete for territory and growth opportunities, the U.S. in most cases simply needed to grab free territory whenever it was needed. You might say Tyrannosaurus Americanis had a soft childhood--always lots of easy prey near at hand and no other big predators in the neighborhood, not even siblings. Such a lucky beast can grow quickly and easily, but it also falls into lazy ways. It does not associate eating with work, but only with hunger. I need, I take, what's the big deal?. When such a beast begins to run into competition from other adult predators, it's future meals can no longer be so easily acquired. In order to continue growing, it must adopt a strategy which takes competition into account. But being habitually a lazy critter, and accustomed to always winning, our particular beast adopted a strategy based on brain rather than brawn. By 1898, the expansion of America's sphere of influence had gone about as far as it could go without running up against comparable competitors. Future expansion would need to be at the expense of other such powers. If America had grown up in a tough neighborhood like Europe, then it might have begun plans to initiate a war with some existing power, in an attempt to pick off their most vulnerable properties--in the tradition of previous rising great powers. But so much work and effort! Uncle Sam wasn't used to that sort of thing. There had to be easier ways to get ahead. The Yankees found a few. * 1918-1941: Setting the Stage for Global Dominance This is one of the most important periods in U.S. history. The conventional historical myth is that the U.S. slept during this period--lost in its isolationism while Europe suffered under civil wars and fascism. In this myth, the U.S. giant is awakened only by a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Then the noble giant, aroused, goes forth to aid the forces of democracy and freedom against the forces of darkness. It's all very much the tale of Rick, in the film "Casablanca", who finally turns from cynic to hero. It's a great story, but the truth is something very different. Let's begin by looking at the world situation preceding World War I. The U.S. had just gobbled up a meal off Spain's plate and was well into the ensuing boom phase--the Gay 90s and the bright new century. For America, a war at this time would have been out of phase. There was no economic necessity. The doctrine of isolationism at that time made sense to American elites and to the population generally. In deciding how to respond to the emerging European conflict, American elites would not be thinking in terms of a predation opportunity--they'd be thinking in terms of geopolitical opportunities. Up to this point the U.S. had little need to concern itself with geopolitics. Staying out of Old World conflicts had been a fundamental principle of American politics and policy since the earliest days of the republic. America's expansion had always been into territories which were not strongly linked to current European geopolitical arrangements. America had been a loner as a world power, tending its own patch and keeping to itself. But America would be needing a meal a few more years down the road, and it had run out of easy pickings. There was good reason for American elites to begin paying attention to geopolitical dynamics. The looming crisis in Europe provided an ideal opportunity for America to begin playing a role in the competitive global arena--without being encumbered by any current acquisition needs of her own. America could come in on either side, or neither. It could play the game without risking any of its own essential chips. It could afford to play its cards in whatever way might provide the best long-term outcome for future American interests. Let's turn our attention now to the situation in Europe leading up to World War I. Geopolitical arrangements were very unstable among European powers. The thousand-year-old Turkish Empire was crumbling, creating an immense power vacuum and an opportunity for territorial acquisition. In the context of centuries old European expansionism, a feeding frenzy was sure to follow. In the 1913 Balkan War, some preliminary adjustments were made, involving Russia, Turkey, and the other local players. But those were not stable arrangements. There were bigger players who had not yet moved. Germany represented a particularly destabilizing influence. Germany's economic and industrial strength had outgrown its imperial status. Its military prowess had been clearly demonstrated in the Franco-Prussian War (1870). Austria-Hungary nominally ran their empire, but Germany had long eclipsed her ally as a military power. Germany felt it was entitled to more imperial territory, and the Kaiser asserted Germany's right to a "place in the sun" (1911). This does not imply any unusual aggressiveness in the German attitude.The Kaiser was simply asserting Germany's right to play the same game that other powers had been playing since 1492. But more significant than Germany's feelings about it's place in the sun was Germany's economic situation. In terms of its economic cycle, Germany was reaching the very-hungry stage. It had been recently unified, acquired a few imperial territories, developed an imperial economy, and had grown that economy to the point where further significant internal growth was unachievable. And like America at the time, it had run out of easy pickings. It was a proud country, a strong country, and in order to thrive it needed to expand. Why should it not have its share of the beached Turkish whale? Britain and France, however, saw no reason to share any spoils with anyone unless they were compelled to do so. Geopolitics is based on realpolitik, not on self-proclaimed rights to a fair share. In this unstable context, all sorts of alliances and counter alliances were formed among the various players. Everyone was jockeying for position in anticipation of the upcoming event. Militaries were mobilizing. Some because they had campaigns they wanted to pursue, and some in order to be able to respond effectively and protect their own interests. With all those alliances, and all that military preparedness, Europe was a powder keg waiting for a spark. Both Britain and Germany were seeking to bring America in on their side. Each knew that America's industrial and economic strength would be able to decisively tip the delicate balance of power either way, the choice was up to America. But America had just dined at Spain's expense and had no need or desire to get involved in a major war at that time. To be sure it could lend assistance to one side or the other, but even there it hesitated. There was no consensus in elite circles, or in public opinion, as to which side best served American interests. For the time being, America stuck to its traditional isolationist stance. The war broke out, the players scrambled for territories in the Balkans and North Africa, and the European theater turned into a horribly costly stalemate. Uncle Sam remained aloof. As America watched, Europe was burning itself out. It was killing off a whole generation of its youth and it was spending its wealth in internal struggles. The main effect of the war on America was an increase in business to provide war supplies. America did finally choose sides, and it sent over just enough troops and equipment to swing the balance of power to its chosen winners--after all sides were fully exhausted. Whether America's prolonged neutrality was a matter of laziness or cunning is a question I'll leave for others to examine. In either case, this first American involvement in European geopolitical affairs established a pattern that was to play out later on a grander scale. As the war drew to a close, the scepter of Communism began to hang over a devastated Europe--creating fear among European and American elites. The Soviets had taken over in Russia, and Marxist sentiments were running high among European populations. The U.S. and Britain sent a joint expeditionary force into Russia in the vain hope of destabilizing the Revolution and encouraging an effective White Russian uprising. But the Soviet Union remained as an inspiration to millions of workers who felt oppressed by capitalism. The fervor of these malcontents was fired even more by the economic stagnation that gripped postwar Europe. While the Soviets were allegedly creating a workers' paradise, Europe found itself in the economic doldrums--due partly to the one-sided Treaty of Versailles and partly to the prohibitive trade barriers that had been established in vain attempts to stimulate local economies. Meanwhile America was experiencing a boom phase--the Roaring 20's. Production levels kept rising, consumption rose to match it, and literally everyone was playing the stock market. The whole economy was going up, up, up like a balloon that would never stop rising. But alas the balloon turned out to be a bubble, and it finally burst. Demand for goods started to fall, production began to be cut back, and a rapid downward spiral dragged the American and European economies into the Great Depression of the 1930's. The 1929 crash came thirty one years after America's most recent predation in 1898. The boom phase had lasted unusually long on this cycle, probably due to unusually high profits accumulated through war sales. Indeed the boom seems to have gone on longer than was healthy. By 1929 the consolidation phase was overdue and it was nearly time for another predation. Consolidation proceeded very well under depression conditions. As small businesses and banks folded, the larger corporations and banks were able to acquire their assets at bargain prices. When small farms defaulted on their mortgages, the land was taken over by the banks or bought up by large agricultural operators. In this way Safeway and the Bank of America gained huge tracts of valuable farmland in California. Such Depression- era land acquisitions set the stage for the huge growth in corporate agribusiness in the post World War II era. As regards pursuing another predation, America just wasn't ready. The crash of '29 had not been anticipated; the timing was too early. The American economic machine, which had been relentlessly growing ever since the Revolution, finally came to a halt. Indeed, the capitalist economic engine had come to a halt everywhere. In Europe, these conditions led to an upsurge in communist and anarchist movements. Increasingly, people were perceiving that capitalism was failing them, and they were seeking to get another economic system adopted. This aroused fears not only in elite circles, but among reactionary elements in the population as well. A climate of polarization developed, and fascist movements emerged in opposition to the leftist movements. In response to all these circumstances, European elites began to look to fascism as a way to deal with their problems--both political and economic. Politically, the adoption of fascism would enable leftist movements to be suppressed and their leaders arrested. Elites would be able to retain control of society. Economically, fascism is based on a centrally-planned command economy, giving elites the flexibility to implement coherent recovery programs. And under fascism it would be possible to undertake imperial expansion. With dictatorial control, the pacifist sentiments of the population--still weary from the "war to end all wars"--could be swept aside. Elites began to covertly encourage and support fascist groups. With such help, Mussolini took power in Italy in 1922. During the Weimar era in Germany, military intelligence hit squads routinely assassinated leftist movement leaders, and indeed any leaders who stood up for democratic principles. The talents of Adolph Hitler were recognized by Army Intelligence, and agent Ernst Rohm was sent in to watch over Hitler and to help guide the development of the Nazi party. German industrialists, Krupp and others, funneled funds to the Nazis. As expected, when Mussolini and Hitler came to power, they proceeded directly with the command implementation of economic recovery programs, and they began preparations for imperial expansion. Mussolini said that fascism should really be called corporatism, for it represents the merger of government and corporate power. In Germany and Italy, by 1933, European elites had arranged such mergers. Herr Krupp became Oberfuhrer of Reich Industry under Hitler, managing all industry that came under Nazi control. Fascism was the European elite's response to the Great Depression and to the collapse of the capitalist economic engine. Mussolini could get the trains running on time again, fascism could get the imperialist money pump running again, and anyone who didn't like the program could be put in a concentration camp. In the U.S., the elite response to the Great Depression was superficially very different than in Europe, but in substance very much the same. Rather than fanning the flames of polarization, FDR and the New Deal sought to guide the nation toward a consensus solution to the economic crisis. But, as under fascism, the U.S. was using a centrally-planned command economy as the means of implementing a recovery program. And whereas Germany and Italy prepared to launch aggressive campaigns of expansion, the U.S. did not. But, as under fascism, the U.S. was plotting to to expand its economic sphere of influence--but by more subtle means. While America was officially neutral towards European affairs in a political and diplomatic sense, it was in fact heavily involved in European developments. There was widespread support for fascism in American elite circles, and to some extent in the population. Hitler and his programs were openly admired by people like Henry Ford, Joseph Kennedy, Prescott Bush, Herbert Hoover, and Charles Lindbergh. An American version of the Nazi party held huge rallies and cheered impassioned speakers like Lindbergh. American media coverage of fascism was generally favorable. I happened to come across an old Reader's Digest issue from the 1930's. It contained a flattering interview with two young Germans, a man and woman, who told glowingly of the progress being made in the "New Germany". As regards the "Jewish problem", the youths calmly explained that if you have a cancer, you must root it out. The Reader's Digest interviewer didn't seem to find anything unreasonable about that. This moral support of fascism was only the tip of the iceberg. Much more substantial American support came in the form of large secret donations to Hitler and Mussolini during their rise to power, investments in German and Italian firms after fascism was installed, and the establishment of American owned factories in Nazi Germany. Ford and General Motors plants, to name only two examples, helped produce the Luftwaffe bombers and Panzer tanks that were to overrun Europe and carry out the blitz over Britain. One of the reasons the Auschwitz concentration camp was built was to provide slave labor for Prescott Bush's oil operations in Silesia. These American plants continued operating throughout World War II and strategic supplies were frequently shunted by American operators to the Nazi war machine when allied forces critically needed those same supplies. At the end of the war Ford and General Motors sued for--and were awarded--$30 millions damages from the American government because their plants had been damaged in allied bombing raids. America's investments in Germany and Italy--and in Imperial Japan as well--were an important part of America's economic recovery program during the 1930's. World War I had helped spark a boom in the American economy, and European and Japanese preparations for the next war were again making a similar contribution. American elites had learned many lessons from their experience of World War I. One of those lessons is that there are large profits to be made by standing on the sidelines of conflicts while doing business with both sides. Another lesson was that choosing sides late in a conflict enables one to exercise leverage over the outcome while avoiding the expense and casualties of early involvement. In the World War I experience, however, America did not gain any great advantage from this leverage. But as World War II approached, America was preparing translate that leverage into global dominance. "If we see that Germany is winning, we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning, we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible, although I don't want to see Hitler victorious in any circumstances." --Harry S. Truman, New York Times, 24 June 1941 Hitler's agenda was clear. He had published it in Mein Kampf and he remained true to it always. His main mission in life was to subjugate Russia and establish it as a great enslaved hinterland of the Reich. Japan's agenda was also clear, defined by its vision of a Co-Prosperity Sphere and its intention to conquer China and the rest of Asia. The U.S. collaborated--by its business actions--in helping these aggressors prepare for their campaigns. It watched while they launched their attacks and embroiled their troops in wars with the world's two largest nations, China and Russia. It waited until just the right moment, the moment of maximum leverage, and then it entered the fray as an official player--just in time to pick up the spoils from all the other exhausted players. The "right moment" had been very carefully identified in advance. The Council on Foreign Relations carried out a series of economic studies from 1939 to 1941 and decided that Southeast Asia was the line that Japan could not be allowed to cross. And when that line was crossed Roosevelt promptly froze Japanese assets in American banks and thereby cut off Japan's oil supply. Japan considered that an act of war, which was to be expected, and Japan's reaction was anticipated by Roosevelt. He waited patiently for the inevitable attack, which was soon known from decrypted messages to be Pearl Harbor. When the intelligence reports came in identifying the time of attack, the strategic carriers were dispatched to sea and antiquated ships were left in harbor as sacrificial lambs. By first pretending neutrality, and later pretending surprise and outrage over the attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. was able to enter the war as a perceived wronged party, presumably innocent of any imperial designs of its own. The supposedly slept-through inter-war years prepared the way for a brief four years of high-leverage U.S. military activity between 1942 and 1945. When the dust had settled, the U.S. emerged with control of the seven seas, an intact economy and military, 40% of the world's wealth and industrial capacity, a monopoly on nuclear weapons, and had escaped the destruction and economic hardship suffered by all the other participants in the war. America was at its peek while everyone else was on the floor. It had pulled off the greatest coup in world history and no one even noticed. It had achieved overwhelming global hegemony while being perceived as a benevolent liberator. It had power, wealth, and psychology on its side as it set out to shape the postwar world. The lion was preparing to run the world, and he was being welcomed in most parts of the world as a lamb. In terms of its economic cycles, 1934 was about the time Tyrannosaurs Americanis was due for its next predation. But the cycle had been disrupted by the crash of '29 and the ensuing depression. America engaged in a holding action--stimulating its economy by doing business with all parties--while it waited for its chance to expand its economic sphere of influence. And instead of competing for its own private sphere, as imperial powers had always done before, America found a way to gain access to most of the globe for its next cycle of economic growth. American elites had developed a plan to transform the nature of imperialism and to create a new system of world order--under its own leadership and guidance. ________________________________________________________ -- ============================================================ If you find this material useful, you might want to check out our website (http://cyberjournal.org) or try out our low-traffic, moderated email list by sending a message to: •••@••.••• You are encouraged to forward any material from the lists or the website, provided it is for non-commercial use and you include the source and this disclaimer. Richard Moore (rkm) Wexford, Ireland _____________________________ "...the Patriot Act followed 9-11 as smoothly as the suspension of the Weimar constitution followed the Reichstag fire." - Srdja Trifkovic There is not a problem with the system. The system is the problem. Faith in ourselves - not gods, ideologies, leaders, or programs. _____________________________ "Zen of Global Transformation" home page: http://www.QuayLargo.com/Transformation/ QuayLargo discussion forum: http://www.QuayLargo.com/Transformation/ShowChat/?ScreenName=ShowThreads cj list archives: http://cyberjournal.org/cj/show_archives/?lists=cj newslog list archives: http://cyberjournal.org/cj/show_archives/?lists=newslog _____________________________ Informative links: http://www.globalresearch.ca/ http://www.MiddleEast.org http://www.rachel.org http://www.truthout.org http://www.zmag.org http://www.co-intelligence.org ============================================================